Débora De Souza De Almeida (Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain)*

BETWEEN TYPES AND STEREOTYPES: THE TERRORIST IN QUESTION

1. Introduction

Terrorism, which can be interpreted as a phenomenon of macro-criminality, usually leads the States to a criminal policy guided by the Enemy's Criminal Law (G. Jakobs, M. Cancio Meliá, 2003) or by Third-Speed Criminal Law (J. M. Silva Sánchez, 2001).

Despite the definition of terrorism does not find agreement among experts on the subject (I. Sommier, 2020), part of them understand that the central element of terrorism is the participation in an organization with terrorist objectives (M. Cancio Meliá, 2010a). For others, terrorism can be committed by individuals without any link with any terrorist group.

The first doctrinal current justifies its understanding in the fact that terrorism has a collective character, which characterizes it as an organized crime, which is why a prior definition of a terrorist organization is needed in the law. And even though there are, on occasions, actions committed individually by some members of the organization, this in no way denatures the organized and collective character of this form of crime.

The second doctrinal line contends that terrorism can be committed by individuals without any link with any terrorist organization, admitting, therefore, the controversial figure of individual terrorism. Individual terrorism, it should be remembered, has a controversial concept, upon which some experts argue that there is a difference between the roles of individual terrorist, lone actors and lone wolves, while other bolster the argument that there should be no difference at all.

* PhD in Law, Government and Public Policy (Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain).

In the background of this debate is the recognition of a supposed transposition of an "old terrorism" into a "new terrorism" (M. Crenshaw, 2008), which form the so-called "waves of terrorism". Under this classification, contemporary terrorism is formed by the 4th (D. Rapoport, 2001) and 5th (F. Hartleb, 2020) waves, which correspond, respectively, to a collective terrorism and an individual terrorism. Thus, considering that the dichotomy between an "old" and a "new" terrorism influences the elaboration of preventive and repressive measures against terrorism, this article will address questions related to the types and stereotypes of terrorists, more precisely the collective terrorist (member of terrorist organization) and the individual terrorist (individual terrorist, lone actor, lone wolf).

2. Collective terrorist today and the structural aspects of the terrorist organization

Terrorism, which in the past "was practiced by a group of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization with a clear command and control apparatus and a defined set of political, social or economic objectives" (B. Hoffman, 1999b, 8), today has become a complex phenomenon.

Despite the idea that terrorist organizations are always governed by a vertical and unified hierarchy, there are signs that many have a structure relatively (M. K. Jalālza'ī, 2006) less cohesive (P. G. Chew, S. H. Quek, 2003; B. Hoffman, 1999a), diffuse (D. Kilcullen, 2020; B. Hoffman, 1999a; 1999b; T. Schofield, 1999; United States Commission on National Security/21ST Century, 1999), more horizontal and ad hoc (T. Badey, 2008).

Bousquet (former director of the French Internal Intelligence Service) affirms that terrorist groups are diffuse, defying any categorical logic. Rather than being homogeneous, they are heterogeneous, with geographic and cultural characteristics that sometimes appear to be incompatible. Given this, its structure, in a material sense, is prone to presenting more diffuse ideological nuances, beyond the official justification of the terrorist organization. In a formal sense, it is possible that its structure extends with active cells and nodes throughout the world (K. L. Lerner, B. W. Lerner, 2006; B. Gagnon, 2006; 2007), becoming more horizontal, without specific leaders (J. T. McCann, 2006).

Thus, there are 2 structural models of terrorist groups: a vertical and a horizontal one (A. Kurz, 1987). While the vertical structure refers to the classic pattern of a terrorist organization, with a clear hierarchical structure and a superior command, the horizontal one usually has more horizontal groups, with less centralization of command (M. Morgan, 2008; T. Badey, 2008) – which does not mean a "egalitarian cells" or "leaderless" groups (F.

Khosrokhavar, 2021). This horizontal model, originated in the 90s, allows the formation of autonomous cells (J. Matusits, 2013), which generate discussion about their true factual or juridic position: whether they ought to be interpreted as affiliated with a terrorist organization or as a materialization of individual terrorism.

There are experts who understand that the terrorist structure is increasingly ad hoc (P. R. Pillar, 2004; A. O'Day, 2004), counting on a "wide range of smaller groups that often attack on their own initiative or come together for a single attack" (Z. Bauman, 2007). However, as will be seen below, this interpretation is questionable, because carrying out an attack on your own initiative is closer to the role of the lone actors or lone wolves. And the fact of coming together for a single attack, seems to fit more with the idea of individual terrorism, when it is not perpetrated on their own initiative.

Furthermore, the terrorist structure, even the vertical one, has high reconstruction power. When one of their leaders is captured, the terrorist networks quickly rebuild, as Clarke (former head of the British anti-terrorist police) explains. This situation reveals a fluid composition of the terrorist network, comparable to a nanotechnological phenomenon of self-composition of cells lost in a torn tissue (*ivi*).

All these issues are cause for concern, since they impact on prevention, making it difficult to identify and analyze terrorist risk, also influencing on repression, which must be based on a legal definition of terrorism, terrorist organization, individual terrorist, lone actor or lone wolf.

3. Some proposals for defining a terrorist organization

Defining parameters of what a terrorist organization is is not an easy task, but it is important to differentiate it from autonomous cells or other forms of individual terrorism. In the theoretical field, there is discussion about which characteristics must be present for this kind of organized crime (V. Ruggiero, 2019) to be characterized.

For García-Pablos de Molina (1978), the definition of a terrorist organization must be guided fundamentally by a functional concept, that is, with a focus on the existence of an organized structure with members in different functions. In this perspective, the number of members, the permanence in time are secondary elements.

On the other hand, for Llobet Anglí (2020), two elements must be valued: one structural and the other teleological. The structural element must indicate the number of people necessary to form an organization, the relationship between them (if it is horizontal or vertical) and its duration in time (if it is stable or not). As regards to the teleological element, it is necessary to set the

types of crimes to be prosecuted (if only the serious crimes or also the less serious ones).

For Cancio Meliá (2010b), the criteria to define a terrorist organization must be its means of action, which are instrumental, alongside a teleological one. Under this reasoning, the means of action of a terrorist organization are the recourse to massive intimidation, the armed character and the so-called "strategic projection".

Mass intimidation, described as "instrumental terrorism" (*ivi*), is a terrorist communication strategy that uses violence (A. Burkhalter, 2016) to obtain, as indicated by Horgan (2006, 25), "some kind of effect in a political context". Among the effects is the spread of a state of alarm, which defies the forces of the State and intimidates the social corpus by fear, concern and uncertainty.

The terrorist, with the aim to provoke more fear and insecurity, selects the victim at random (M. Cancio Meliá, 2010a), but always under a "categorization", which is a principle of cognitive economy (A. Abarca Blanco, 2008). These potential victims are chosen based on specific criteria (e.g., members of the public security or political representatives) or even generic ones, as long as fit into the target category (Westerners, Americans etc.).

Violence, according to Cancio Meliá (2010a), occurs with the intense or repetitive use of firearms or explosives. These tools portray the armed nature of the action, which is responsible for the massive intimidation. And although this position encountered criticism (E. Delbecque, 2017) due the fact of terrorism has used (and can use) other instruments, data from the Global Terrorism Index demonstrate that firearms and explosives are currently the most used means, causing high-lethality attacks.

The "strategic projection" (M. Cancio Meliá, 2010a), in turn, means that the purpose that characterizes the terrorist activity is not the individual wishes or objectives of the perpetrator, but the purposes and objectives pursued by the terrorist organization (e.g. overthrowing the constitutional order). This assumes that the organization has an action program, and the members must act accordingly, executing its typical goals. And it is important to say that the prevalence of the organization's goals over individual motivations is also a characteristic required by the FBI to define terrorism (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019).

Llobet Anglí (2010) presents an alternative definition, that it is possible to commit terrorism, without belonging to a terrorist organization. This proposal, which focuses on the subjective element, admits that a group of individuals who do not belong to any organization may be guilty of terrorism, as long as pursue the same objective and making continuous use of violence in their terrorist actions (M. Llobet Anglí, 2016). But the legislation must be

clear to differentiate members (who have a stable position in the organization chart) from collaborators (who act occasionally) (M. Llobet Anglí, 2020). This means that acts of terrorism and association with terrorism can be considered autonomous crimes, as they are in some countries.

Nevertheless, if we take into account the criteria proposed by Cancio Meliá, we can conclude that the lonely actors or wolves can meet all of these criteria: the armed character, the massive intimidation and even, in some cases, the strategic projection of a terrorist organization. Furthermore, collective and individual terrorism resort to "performative violence", which is the key point of the action of terrorism, aiming at mass intimidation. After all, in the words of Antonio Ruggiero (2005, 510), "terrorism is political theater, it is the manipulation of symbols and, as such, disturber of the conscience". And the "performative violence" (M. Liem, J. Van Buuren, J. Van Zuijdewijn *et al.*, 2018) is a way in which the perpetrator of violence seeks to have his existence and uniqueness recognized, as a way of searching for its meaning and significance in a complex world, at a time when traditional ideologies have lost most of their appeal.

4. The complex classification of individual terrorist, lone actor and lone wolf

According to the IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015), the majority of terrorist threats and attacks in the West do not come from organized groups, but from lone wolves. In fact, the number of attacks perpetrated by "lone actors" in countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has increased in recent years. For the FBI, although the most lethal attacks in the world were committed by terrorist organizations, the most lethal ones against the US were carried out by lone wolves, possibly due to a high capacity for strategic action in monitoring cells and organizations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019).

The lone wolf is a big concern for many countries (J. Simon, 2016), as it is an increasingly common character in terrorism (S. Moskalenko, C. McCauley, 2020), as well as difficult to detect (UN General Assembly, 2016) or to intercept (R. H. Burke, 2021), since it does not belong to a terrorist organization (D. M. Zierhoffer, 2014). Still, there is always the risk of a person being hastily labeled a lone wolf, when in fact he is a murderer (M. Liem, J. Van Buuren, J. Van Zuijdewijn *et al.*, 2018), a mass shooter (C. S. Allely, 2020) and, maybe, an amok (H. Imai, O. Yusuke, O. Kiyohito *et al.*, 2019; G. Cormann, J. Hammers, 2021); or never been interested in terrorism (S. Poynting, 2016), being, at most, a radical, if we considered, "that all terrorists are radical but that most radicals are not terrorists" (E. Bakker, B. Graaf, 2010, 5).

If spotting a lone wolf is a difficult task, it should be noted that defining it is too. There are several definitions of this figure, which result from being intertwined with other definitions, such as that of "individual terrorist". While some experts believe that these are different situations, others understand them as identical. And there are also those who consider that there is a relation of genus and species.

This conceptual controversy is prejudicial insofar as it can affect anti-terrorism policies, especially in a repressive regulatory environment, because according to the characteristics of each of these figures, the crime of terrorism, depending on the criminal law of each country, will be characterized or not. Thus, the search for a precise definition of these figures is fundamental in the criminology and in the criminal policy, collaborating in prevention of threats. So, what should be understood by lone wolf?

Although "lone wolf" is a term widely used in academia, it is rejected by the main police agencies in the world. Currently, the FBI (2019) refers to this type as a "lone offender" or, in the words of the ex director Comey (2014), a "lone rat", for understand that "wolf" offers an undue glamor (D. Byrman, 2015). EUROPOL (2012) prefers the term "lone actor", a position that may be justifiable from the idea that "wolf" is a sensationalist term, and that would give them a connotation of cunning that is not always present (B. Schuurman, L. Lindekilde, S. Malthaner *et al.*, 2019). In any case, this article will reproduce the exact term used by each of the cited studies.

4.1. Individual terrorist and lone wolf are identical figures

The Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management defines the lone wolf and the individual terrorist as identical figures, under the label "individual terrorist". The individual terrorist acts alone, and is not part of the terrorist groups or networks. Not being under the direct influence of a leader or a hierarchy, this type of terrorist plans and executes his tactics and methods on his own initiative, without observing any external direction or order (J. María Blanco, 2012). Haley and Bohm (2007) also treat lone wolf as an individual terrorist, but add the possibility of this figure acting in small groups, and not just alone.

4.2. Individual terrorist and lone wolf are genus and species

Framis and Álvarez (2015) propose a different classification: the lone wolf is one of the forms of individual terrorism. This means that the lone wolf is a subclass of individual terrorist. María Blanco (2012) agrees with this, commenting the most restrictive definition posible lead us to a idea of a specific subclass.

4.3. Individual terrorist and lone wolf are parallel categories

For most of the researchers, the individual terrorist should not be confused as lone wolf or lone actor, since all of them are parallel categories, of the same rank. EUROPOL (2012), e.g., uses the expression "lone actors" to deal with lone wolves, while calling individual terrorists "lone terrorists". For this agency, "lone actors" are those who act independently of other organizations or associations, while "lone terrorists" commit acts of terrorism with the support or active assistance of a terrorist organization.

5. The lone wolf must always act alone or can act in small groups?

The idea that the lone wolf can only act alone is found in Burton and Stewart (2008), who consider him as a "person who acts alone, without orders and relationship with an organization". Bakker and Graaf (2010, 2) also point out that lone wolves "are inspired by a certain group, but who are not under the orders of any person, group or network". Khosrokhavar (2014, 136) denominates the lone wolf a self-radicalized individual who acts alone and radicalizes himself individually under the influence of a group that reinforces by internet or another contact his warrior creed "without constituting with him a terrorist network or getting involved in attacks".

The definition presented by Kaplan (1997) is also identical with respect to the existence of independent acts, without order or hierarchy, but it diverges with respect to the number of individuals. For this researcher, with Kaplan, Lööw, Malkki (2015) lone wolf is related to "leaderless resistance", that can be defined as a kind of lone wolf operation in which an individual, or a very small group acting as an autonomous cell, independently of any leader or organization support. The hypothesis of a small group is also recognized by Tofangsaz (2020).

Spaaij (2012) and Guinart (2014), in turn, understand that a small group is only posible in individual terrorist` hypothesis. For them, the individual terrorist can act alone or in small groups, under the direction or not of others, but always under the influence of a leader and integrating a terrorist group. In opposition, the lone wolf always acts on its own, with methods and tactics planned and directed by itself, not obeying external order or supervision, nor a direct influence of a leader, not belonging to a terrorist group. The lone wolf therefore acts totally independently, as Friedlander, Sidney Levie and Musch (1979) assumed.

6. Is the lone wolf truly lonely?

Is the lone wolf truly lonely? While some experts believe it is possible, others doubt it.

Mathias (2020, 30) agrees that, in some cases, politicians and intelligence officials disseminated the myth of the lone wolf to reassure public opinion, because there are cases that "in reality the lone wolf was hiding the herd". For Kepel, "the lone wolf theory is an imbecility. (...) There are individuals who may act alone or in pairs, but they are part of networks, they have been inspired" (RFI, 2015). Burke (2017a) holds that "lazy talk of 'lone wolves' obscures the real nature of the threat", remembering "before the rise of the lone wolf, security officials used phrases – all equally flawed – such as 'homegrowns', 'cleanskins', 'freelancers' or simply 'unaffiliated'". For him, the lone wolves are not really lone.

Baca believes that rarely does the so-called lone wolf have the ability to plan truly solo an attack, without any outside collaboration (Congress House, 2012). For this reason, he believes that solitary is only the execution of the plan (the attack). A lone wolf, according to Kaplan, Lööw and Malkki (2015) is largely influenced by the Internet, where they communicate with other like-minded actors, who are not members of terrorist organizations. And in fact, "there is a proliferation of sites built by lone wolves and sites sponsored by organized groups that encourage lone wolf activism" (R. Howard, R. Sawyer, 2003, 290). But it is clear that this situation, in a way, jeopardizes the difference based on obedience to order, acting under supervision (although not hierarchical) and the existence of direct influence, which are criteria that define lone wolf and individual terrorist.

The direct contact with other groups, through networks and chats, can, according to some experts (J. María Blanco, 2012), be understood as a direct influence, moving away from the lone wolf archetype. However, Schurrmann, Lindekilde and Malthaner *et al.* (2019, 771-778) argue that this interaction, in most cases, is usually deficient, superficial and discontinuous, not making the lone wolf someone effectively integrated into these networks, but, at most, inspired or taught by them. Thus, the lone wolf plans, prepares and executes violent acts alone, not because they consciously prefer doing it alone, but rather because they have some "disposition, lack of social skills or mental health problems". Kaplan, Lööw and Malkki (2015) alerts that in few cases the lone wolf receive concrete assistance for preparation of attacks (such as logistics assistance, manufacture of bombs and transport).

The receipt of some form of assistance does not exclude, according to an expansive current of interpretation, the attribute of "lone wolf". According to Dankert (2017), supporter of this current of thought, there are 3 types of lone wolves, all radicalized via Internet: 1) those who is inspired by terrorist propaganda, but has no personal contact with a terrorist organization; 2) those who communicates through chats with members of terrorist groups, where they talk about ideas and objectives, but without receive direct instructions for attacks; 3) those who agrees to a virtual glider support in the

choice of objectives and assistance in the technical plan for the attack, but without receiving specific orders or deadlines.

For Pantucci (2011), there are 4 types of lone wolves: 1) those who acts totally alone, using some form of extremist ideology as justification for their action, but does not have clear connections with a broader network of terrorism; 2) those who acts alone, but has a connection with terrorist networks, although it is not part of the structure and does not obey the orders of any terrorist organization; 3) those who acts in a group of lone wolves, but remains independent of a control structure and a formal command of a terrorist organization; 4) those who executes the attack alone, having a clear link with the command and control of a terrorist organization.

However, under a critical or restrictive gaze, we believe that only the first type pointed out by Dankert and Pantucci that could be effectively branded as a "lone wolf", since it is the only one that does not receive any form of external logistical or operational support. The other types, if we use an expression from Toboso Bueno (2014, 12), are a "contamination of the lone wolf concept". And going further, we observe that the group 4 described by Pantucci fits more closely to the archetype of the individual terrorist, acting under the "remote control" of a terrorist organization.

In any case, the FBI understands that it is possible to have some assistance at some stage of the planning and execution of the attack, since the lone wolf is the main architect of the plan and the protagonist in the execution (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019). In other words, the FBI advocates an expansive definition of lone wolf.

7. Is there a unique terrorist profile?

In the popular imaginary there is the stereotype that terrorism is an eminently Arab (G. Seeman, 2014; M. Suleiman, 1988) and Muslim practices (J. Matusitz, 2013; P. R. Harris, D. R. Levine, R. M. Shusta, 2005), coming from a group of poor, ignorant, immature, bad, sociopathic, weak, brainwashed, mentally ill, religious fanatics, familiarly unstructured (M. Sageman, 2004) etc. This stereotype is usually widespread in fiction and even in infotainment media programs. But as many experts (M. E. Vargo, 2021; P. Gill, 2015; C. Ellis, R. Pantucci, R. Van Zujdewijn *et al.*, 2016) and the IEP affirms, in general, the terrorist does not correspond to stereotypes, since there is no unique identifiable profile.

7.1. Profile of a terrorist in collective terrorism

Although the terrorist does not correspond to stereotypes, the search for the terrorist profile is, according to criminological investigations, important in

helping to identify threats (D. M. Zierhoffer, 2014) and to limit the risk of error in that assessment (M. Guidère, 2010). Many studies have been developed, and what has been observed is that reality shows that each terrorist group has different characteristics and members of varied characteristics.

In Al Qaeda, e.g., of the 400 members of a sample (M. Sageman, 2004):
1) 3/4 is upper or middle class;
2) 3/4 with profession;
3) 63% had university studies, with knowledge of 2 or 3 Western languages;
4) 90% come from a structured family;
5) 73% are married with children;
6) 80% felt somehow totally excluded from the society in which they lived;
7) 70% become religious after joining the jihad, while living in a country in which they had not grown up;
8) 88% were previously close to people who had some connection with the jihad;
9) the average age is 26 years;
10) a large part had no criminal record;
11) only 1% had signs of mental disorder.

ISIS, in turn, according Pulido (2015), Dearden (2016), Ozeren and Cubukcu (2021):
1) has members from 90 countries;
2) 10% of which come from Europe;
3) the vast majority are men;
4) nearly 2/3 are single;
5) the average age is 26 or 27 years;
6) most completed high school, and many have higher education and college degrees;
7) members from Europe tend to be younger than others, and more highly educated;
8) 70% has a basic religious knowledge;
9) 90% had no previous jihadist experience;
10) many were students or unemployed before joining the jihad.

In Spain, an investigation was carried out on a sample of 145 Western jihadists who perpetrated attacks between January 1, 2006 and May 31, 2018 in Europe and North America (M. J. Galvis Doménech, I. Cañadas Osisnki, 2020). The objective of this research is to point out the risk factors for radicalization, but we believe that it also contributes to indicate the complexity of identifying a terrorist profile.

According to the results of this empirical research, in Europe:
1) 93.3% are men;
2) a largely are from European countries: France (more than 1/5), Germany, Belgium, Spain etc.;

3) 85% are homegrown terrorists;
4) the average age is 27 years;
5) 53.3% are single, 22.9% married, 4.8% separated and 2.9% divorced;
6) 45.7% are low socioeconomic profile, 29.5% of medium level, 4.8% of high level, 11.4% in a situation of poverty, and the rest of unknown status;
7) 40% are employed;
8) 60% had a criminal record;
9) 30% had mental disorder.
    In North America:
1) 95% are men;
2) they predominantly are from the US, followed far behind by Canada and Bali;
3) 60% are homegrown terrorists;
4) the average age is 29 years;
5) 50% are single, 30% married, 5% separated, 5% divorced, and a remainder whose status is unknown;
6) 57.5% are of medium socioeconomic level, 20% of low level, 15% high level, 10% living in poverty (10%), having also a remaining unknown;
7) 32.5% had a job;
8) 57% had a criminal record;
9) 20% had mental disorder.
   The above investigation does not report whether these attackers were actors or lone wolves or whether they were members of a terrorist organization. But there are studies (K. Rekawek, V. Szucs, M. Babíková *et al.*, 2019; S. Matějka, V. Szucs *et al.*, 2018) that indicate that the largest number of those arrested for terrorism in Europe have some connection to terrorist networks, although most have been found alone. And it is worth remembering that in the Europe, after the creation of ISIS (F. Khosrokhavar, 2021), the recruitment has increased among young people, mainly men.

7.2. Profile of a terrorist in the individual terrorism

The profile of solitary actors is varied (P. Gill, 2015), not conforming to stereotypes. According to US statistics (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019) referring to lone wolf attacks between 1972 and 2015:
1) 65% are white;
2) 47,90% born in the US;
3) 48% are single;
4) 33% with children;
5) 90% with educational training (38% completed secondary education, 28% the degree, 10% the master and 4% the doctorate);

6) all are men;

7) the mean age of 37 years (between 15 and 88 years);

8) 54% were unemployed;

9) 70% were arrested at least once during adulthood, but not for a violent act;

10) 83% had shown aggressive behavior before the attack;

11) 1/4 had a mental disorder, and 40% had suicidal ideation regarding the attack;

12) in 94%, the ideological orientation has emerged at least a year from the attack, mainly divided into: violent anti-government extremism (25%); violent racial extremism (23%); and violent extremism Islamic radical (19%).

In Europe, there is not much detailed research on the profile of lone wolves. Anyway, there is an empirical study by Liem, Van Buuren and Van Zuijdewijn (2018) which reveals that many lonely actors completed secondary or higher education, and that they did not live (contrary to what is imagined) necessarily in isolation. They also concludes that the percentage of mental disorder in the sample does not differ much from the general European population, which means that is erroneous the popular belief that this type of disorder is a fundamental characteristic of the lone wolf (C. S. Allely, 2020).

7.3. Deconstructing the terrorist stereotypes

In summary, the conclusion reached in many empirical studies that have been presented so far is that terrorism does not correspond to stereotypes.

There are terrorists from different nationalities and cultures, acting alone or under a terrorist organization`s orders. In the US (N. R. Springer, 2013), cases of deadliest terrorism were committed by nationals. And in Europe, according to studies mentioned in this article, there are a large number of homegrown.

Besides that, there are terrorists with mental disorders, but the percentage, according to empirical studies already cited, is not higher than the average of the general population,

In addition, there are terrorists with rudimentary literacy skills, but there are many others who have attended or completed high school or university studies, even with knowledge of western languages. For some terrorists groups, a rudimentary literacy skills is a factor that facilitates recruitment and indoctrination; for others, a higher level of education it is preferable for the success of the mission, assuming the attacker thinks and reacts quickly (T. L. Oroszi, D. H. Ellis, 2019).

Moreover, many terrorists, according to empirical studies here cited, had no previous jihadist conviction, which is a rough indicator of Roy`s theory.

Roy (2015; 2017; P. Hedges, 2017) explains there is an "Islamization of radicalism", where religion is the effect of radicalization, not the cause (G. Mezzetti, F. Introini, 2018). For him, the "Jihadism is a generational and nihilistic revolt", and the Salafist ideology has not been adopted, in fact, by many modern jihadist terrorists, existing a current of Islamism-jihadism that acts on radicalization, but its just playing a marginal role. And it is a concern if we consider that distortion or misuse of beliefs and political ideologies are risks factors for radicalization (IEP, 2015). In opposition, Kepel (2017; D. Cohen, 2021; P. Hedges, 2017; M. Campli, 2021) defend there is a "radicalization of Islam", in which the Salafist ideology, the discontentment over poverty and social prejudice are causes for radicalization.

Even if most of the terrorists in the empirical studies cited here is not married (although the sample of Al-Qaeda shows the opposite), this does not mean that they have or come from a family context that can be considered unstructured.

There are terrorists who had a profession or occupation, but nearly half of sample was unemployed or had never had a job before radicalization. The lack of employment does not necessarily lead someone to terrorism, but it is a risk factor for radicalization, according to UN (General Assembly, 2015) and the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (2016).

A small percentage of terrorists belonging to the upper class, which seems to be enough to deconstruct the terrorist stereotype associated with poverty. However, most of the sample is not part of a high economic class, corresponding to terrorist stereotype. This reinforces the hypothesis of the lack of socio-economic opportunities works as an engine of radicalization, as reported by the UNGA (2015) and his Secretary-General (2016).

According the empirical studies cited, the majority of individual and collective terrorists are men, coinciding to the stereotype. This circumstance can be induced by the culture, which associates violence and politics with masculinity (M. Haam, R. Spaaij, 2017). Anyway, there are women in collective (J. Davis, 2017) and individual terrorism (M. Guidère, 2010), acting in attacks, including as women bombs (IEP, 2019). But they are still a minority (K. Laster, E. Erez, 2021) due natural or cultural issues (S. Schraut, 2021; B. Py, 2021; M. Gonzalez-Perez, 2008).

Furthermore, the most of the sample are young, but this does not justify the association of immaturity with terrorism, because not every young is immature, and immaturity is by no means a driving cause of terrorism. However, the young age is a risk factor for radicalization (M. Wolfowicz, Y. Litmanovitz, D. Weisburd *et al.*, 2020), along with loneliness (B. Schuurman, L. Lindekilde, S. Malthaner *et al.*, 2019), frustration and social rejection (R. Coolsaet, T. Struye de Swielande, 2008).

Several scholars agree the radicalization of young europeans have been increased, mainly men of second (P. Frank, 2021; F. Reinares, 2015; O. Roy, 2015) or third (M. A. Cano Paños, 2015; M. Kaufmann, 2010) generation Muslim who feel uprooted, experiencing a social rejection. These individuals are vulnerable by an identity crisis, since they cannot adapt between the culture of their family of origin ("the tradition-bound world") and the culture of the country where they currently live ("the secularism of the West"). Then, they feel treated as foreigners in both cultures, becoming receptive to the idea of belonging to Islam (A. Kaya, 2018; F. Reinares, 2015; R. Baudouï, F. Esposito, 2015). This search of identity or sense of belonging can be intermixed with another elements of personal, environmental and social nature (M. A. Cano Paños, 2015). Khosrokhavar (2021) explains that "European jihadism is a multi-faceted social, political and cultural phenomenon, linked not only to the extremist behavior of a limited group but also to a broader crisis". And crisis makes way to terrorism: "terrorism, defined as pure political violence, is a reaction to crisis situations and signals total hostility towards closed systems, identified as responsible for those situations. Closed systems, in turn, will tend to close even more in response to those who try to 'open them'" (V. Ruggiero, 2006, 192).

Given all the complexity of the phenomenon, these studies conclude there is no consistent and unique profile of a terrorist, either as a member of a terrorist organization, or as an actor or a lone wolf. For this reason, it is important that investigations continue, although we know that "due to cultural, religious and other differences, there is no simple way to identify the relatively few high-risk individuals in the larger population" (A. P. Schmid, 2021, X).

8. Conclusions

If terrorism, according to more critical theorists, is a political and social construction of facts and actors (S. Englund, M. Stohl, R. Burchill, 2017; D. Duez, 2002), in which each State legally defines who is terrorist and what acts can be called terrorism (J. Soufi, 2015), it may be necessary to rethink some points on the subject.

First of all, the terrorist no corresponds to stereotypes. Although members of certain terrorist organizations present similar characteristics, the same thing happening among the lone wolves of each continent (North America *vs.* Europe), investigations conclude that terrorist profiles are not unique. And this, cannot be denied, interferes in the development of counter-terrorism prevention measures, more precisely in the identification of risks.

But if there is no a unique terrorist profile, there are types of terrorist: the collective terrorist and the individual terrorist, although these definitions are fraught with controversy.

Terrorist organizations become more and more ad hoc and diffuse, which makes it more complex to identify if we are in front of a terrorist organization, or an autonomous group or lone wolves. There are members of terrorist organizations who act alone, and there are lone wolves who (depending on the criminal political concept used), can act with some help from others.

In addition, the internet, through electronic magazines, social networks and chats, allows greater proximity to the terrorist propaganda, blurring the extent to which we are facing indoctrination (which may consist of individual terrorism) or terrorist recruitment (which necessarily characterizes collective terrorism).

These issues even lead to a debate on the restrictive or expansive concepts of the lone wolf, which have an impact on criminal law enforcement measures. It is clear that the restrictive concept is more beneficial to protect the guarantees of the accused against a crime whose penalty is very high, in addition to implying the limitation of many criminal and procedural guarantees. On the other hand, the expansive concept seems to provide greater protection for society in general, because it does not limit differences between mere inspiration, indoctrination or recruitment, which occur mainly through Internet browsing.

As we can see, the turbulent waves of terrorism demand that one direction be chosen, amid so many others. And the great challenge of this election is to conduct the criminal counterterrorism policy without letting criminal law sink.

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Abstract

BETWEEN TYPES AND STEREOTYPES: THE TERRORIST IN QUESTION
This article deals with types and stereotypes of terrorists, in particular with 4th and 5th waves terrorists (i.e., collective and individual terrorism). We analyze vertical and horizontal terrorist organizations and address the points of consensus and controversy about this form of collective terrorism. We then deal with the controversial definition of individual terrorism: how to classify the individual terrorist. Finally, we analyze the stereotypes of collective and individual terrorists in North America and Europe.

Key words: Lonely Wolf, Terrorist Stereotype, Terrorist Organization.