Between Submission and Fidelity: Ottoman Muslim Elite's Changing Perceptions of the Greek Orthodox Populations, 1768-1821[1]

by *Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak*

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This paper analyzes the representation of Greek Orthodox populations in Ottoman documents and chronicles between 1768 and 1821. Contrary to arguments that identify the rise of minorities in late 19th and early 20th centuries, I argue that the roots of the phenomenon can be seen in the Age of Revolutions. After the French Revolution, the passive expectation from non-Muslim populations to submit to Ottoman authority (*raiyyet, itâat*) turn into the active duty of fidelity (*sadâkat*). A parallel development in the meaning of *millet*, now understood both as religious community and nation, resulted in the definition of a core Muslim population for the Empire and homogenized non-Muslims groups in Ottoman discourse.

Keywords: Millet, Greek Orthodox Ottomans, Phanariots, *Ottoman chronicles*.

The Ottoman world-view depended on a distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim populations. This distinction not only concerned the division of the world into the Abode of Islam (*dâr-ül-İslâm*) and the Abode of War (*dâr-ül-harb*); but also, the division of its own populations between Muslims and *zimmî*s. A *zimmî* was a non-Muslim subject in a Muslim country, in a "sort of indefinitely renewed contract through which the Muslim community accords hospitality and protection (…) on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam"[2]. Thus, the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Empire was a given. Still, Ottoman society did not function with clear cut lines between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. It was not a society of segregation but one of shifting alliances and rivalries cutting across religious identities. Non-Muslims used Islamic courts for a variety of reasons; they entered into commercial or political partnerships with Muslims to rival similar regional

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or imperial alliances; they stood together with Muslims as communities to resist the encroachments of the imperial power structure[3]. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about a majority composed of Muslims and different minorities of non-Muslim populations. Ottoman social order depended on a plethora of social relationships that stressed religion but were not limited to it. At the basics, Ottoman society was divided between the *askerî* and the *reâyâ* in terms of social status. *Reâyâ* "denotes the tax-paying subject population as opposed to the servitors of the Ottoman state (*ʿaskerīs*)"[4]. From 18th century onwards, *reâyâ* started denoting Christian taxpayers only, to be crystallized in that meaning in early 19th century[5].

A number of major transformations throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries paved the way for defining the Empire with its Muslim populations. A process of transformation in the terminology of non-Muslim Ottomans' duties to the Ottoman state, from simple submission and obedience (described with words such as *raiyyet*, *itâat* and *inkıyâd*) to fidelity (described with *sadâkat*), can be identified in Ottoman documents of late 18th century. In this process, social differentiations among non-Muslims were increasingly erased in official discourse. Whereas fidelity used to be an expectation only from the servants of the Ottoman state, like the Phanariot Orthodox elite serving the state as dragomans and Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia[6]; it became a generalized duty expected from each member of any religious group. Parallelly, it became easier to be blamed for betrayal.

Another transformation was in the understanding of non-Muslim group identities defined with the word *millet*. *Millet* as a *system* comes immediately to mind whenever the term is invoked. *Millet* as a *system* has for long been central to debates which have been skillfully summarized recently by Eleni Gara[7]. It originated from the arguments of H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen who saw non-Muslim communities as monolithic religious groups that were organized under the leadership of their religious leaders and did not interact with other religions[8]. Benjamin Braude's seminal article has all but destroyed the argument that stressed the religious leaders of non-Muslim communities as their political and economic representatives in the eyes of the Sultan[9]. Modifying Braude, Ursinus asserted that *millet* was a political-religious concept, rather than an administrative one[10]. Later, Paraskevas Konortas examined 18th century transformations for the Orthodox populations and underlined that both *Rum* (Orthodox) and *millet* started being applied to the Orthodox populations of the Empire in late 18th century[11]. More recently, Antonis Hadjikyriacou made an argument for moving beyond this discussion.

He rightfully underlined that *millet* system theories did not explain much about communal dynamics. He demonstrated through early 18th century Cyprus how there was no "system" in communal functions and how the clergy were not the most powerful actors whom the rest of the community followed. Hadjikyriacou finally maintained that the *millet* system was "overrated"[12].

This paper utilizes *millet* as a concept, a discourse of the Ottoman ruling elite, rather than a well-defined system in the sense of a governing mechanism. I focus on the imperial Muslim elite in the capital and study their discourses on Orthodox Christians, mostly in Ottoman Europe. The paper is theoretically inspired by conceptual history, especially the literature on *Begriffsgeschichte*[13]. The discussion is centered around concepts such as *raiyyet*, *itâat*, *sadâkat* and *millet* in late 18thand early 19th centuries. As Koselleck puts forward "a concept must remain ambiguous in order to be a concept. The concept is connected to a word but is at the same time more than a word: a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word"[14]. The discussion in this article is based on the ambiguity of Ottoman concepts like *millet*. The aim is to discuss how this ambiguity can be related to the position of the non-Muslims in the Empire. By referring to conceptual history, I would like to contribute to the burgeoning field of Ottoman conceptual history as well[15].

The concept of *millet* experienced a significant transformation not only due to processes in the Empire, but also in relation to comparable, perhaps untranslatable[16], concepts in European vocabularies, primary among them *nation*[17]. *Millet* started acquiring the modern meaning of nation after the French Revolution without losing its former meanings. So, when it was used in the specific cases under discussion here, it was an amalgamation, parallel to Alexandra Lianeri's understanding "to be understood not as universals, but as amalgamations of different meanings, which include the totality of language uses within a certain historical setting, a totality that is encompassed within the concept itself, once it is detached from its context"[18].

I do not argue at all that we can talk about "minorities" starting with the period under discussion here. Elie Kedourie argued that *millet*s became minorities once "popular suffrage became the basis of authority"[19]. Divorcing Kedourie's argument from "popular suffrage", Benjamin Thomas White in his study on French mandate Syria, argued that the transformation of the state resulting in its claim to represent a

population regardless of the existence of popular suffrage, its attempts at applying its rules uniformly throughout its territories and its use of modern technologies gave "meaning to the twin concepts of majority and minority, understood as groups within a population: terms which emerged in a specific, contemporary context"[20]. Peter Sluglett has recently emphasized the variations that were experienced in the transition from *millet* to minority status in the Arab World. Although he benefited from the recent literature on Ottoman non-Muslims, his focus was the 20th century, inadvertently glossing over a long history of Ottoman connections to modern concepts such as *nation* and Ottoman discussions of them[21]. Following White, I would like to argue that the identification of the state with a population group (religious rather than ethnic), and the claim to the existence of uniform non-Muslim groups that would in later centuries allow for discussion in the lines of majorities and minorities started to emerge early on, as a result of internal discussions that were no doubt linked to their international context. Hence, "minorities" did not appear suddenly in early 20th century in an unsuspecting Ottoman Empire, they were the result of a long-running parallel process. I hope to capture the beginnings of this process without making an argument for the specific trajectory it took in the 19th century.

This paper will make use of Ottoman documents about Orthodox populations of the Empire. It will underline the transformation of the terms used to describe them in the period between the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the Greek Revolution of 1821. It will also refer to Ottoman chronicles and reports written by Ottoman men of letters that were penned in late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Submission to authority

The expectation from *reâyâ*, referring to non-Muslims almost exclusively after 1770s, was to submit to Ottoman authority in a passive way. In late 18th century the main concern of the Ottoman central authority was to keep their subjects under submission (*raiyyet*–the status of *reâyâ*s) and obedience (*itâat or inkıyâd*). This concern can be seen especially during Ottoman-Russian Wars when elements among Orthodox Christians supported Russian armies against the Ottoman Empire.

It might be enlightening to see how such populations are discussed in Ottoman documents. For example, during the Ottoman Russian War of 1768-1774, central officials were trying to make a distinction between subjects in Wallachia that defected to the Russian side and those that stayed

obedient using the word *itâat*. Ali Pasha, who was tasked with guarding Bucharest in late 1769, was asked to "subdue and destroy the Muscovites and Moldavians who entered [into Wallachia] to do evil, together with any Wallachians that might have joined them; but only those traitors (*hâin*) and bandits (*haydûd*) who left obedience (*itâtden hurûc*) and dared to fight against the soldiers of Islam,without assaulting the Wallachian *reâyâ* who are in obedience (*itâatde olan*)"[22].

Similarly, the *Kapudan* (Grand Admiral) Gazi Hasan Pasha who was instructed in 1771 to deal with the Orlov revolt in the Peloponnese and the Aegean islands promised to the inhabitants of the islands that "whoever is be steadfast in their submission (*raiyyet*) will be protected and honored and awarded for the hardships and troubles suffered at enemy hands"[23]. It looks like Ottoman subjects understood the significance of such terminology. Following the end of the war, when the clans of Mani in southern Peloponnese corresponded with the Ottomans to return to submission they "wrote that they were going to enter the road of submission (*câdde-i raiyyet*) and to be obedient (*itâat ve inkıyâd üzere*) to my exalted state and act and serve in safety and fidelity (*sadâkat*) from now on"[24]. This is one of the few cases where fidelity is used to describe the situation of the subject populations. The fact that this document is a summary-translation of what the Maniotes wrote to the Sublime Porte should also be indicative. It was the Maniotes themselves who added fidelity to their "obligations", perhaps in a bid to be recognized as more than simple subjects. In fact, Mani was governed by a leader (*başbuğ*) selected from among Maniote clans by the Ottomans. Maniotes were a lot more than tax-paying subjects and can perhaps be considered on a level that is right below the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia.

After the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774, the concern for *reâyâ* submission grew as the Ottomans found themselves in mortal danger against the expanding Russian Empire. Faced with Russian advances during another war in 1787-1792, the dragoman of the Navy, who was one of the Phanariot Greek-Orthodox elite responsible not only for translations for the Navy but also for keeping in touch with local power holders in the islands in the Mediterranean, was thus charged to make sure that the *reâyâ* of the islands would not "give up proper manners of submission (*raiyyet*) and [would not] quit the circle of obedience (*itâat*)"[25]. More than any other institution, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople was expected to ensure *reâyâ* submission to Ottoman authority. Hence, against Russian meddling in eastern Balkans "the Greek Patriarch was ordered

and warned to coax and ensure the avoiding of deviation from the road of obedience (*itâat*)"[26].

Such concepts were also used in cases where Ottoman Orthodox subjects revolted without the involvement of foreign powers. These terms were thus not simply the antithesis of being subjects to foreign monarchs. An example from the Serbian Revolt of 1804-1813 underlines Ottoman fears. The document talks about a petition received from the leaders of the Serbian Revolt in 1806, betraying the shock felt by the Ottomans: "The demands and conditions that the *reâyâ* have written in this petition give rise to the suspicion that they want to quit the wide road of subjection (*raiyyet*) and desire to acquire the status of a republic (*cumhûrluk*)"[27]. Submission, and the Ottoman terms used to define it, were conceived to be passive acceptance of Ottoman authority. *Reâyâ* communities did not need to act to submit, it was their standard position as far as Ottoman elites were concerned. These communities had to act in order to break their submission. Being a traitor (*hâin*) in this understanding required taking up arms against Ottoman power. Ottoman documents described non-Muslim communities in these terms when they chose to side against Ottoman power, be it by their own volition or by the meddling of rival empires.

Fidelity to the Sublime State

Fidelity, on the other hand, was an active performance. As such, it was expected of those who were the servants of the Sultan. While words such as *raiyyet* (submission), *itâat, inkıyâd* (obedience) were used to describe the expectations from non-elite non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, *sadâkat* (fidelity) was almost exclusively desired from the servants of the Sultan.

Thus, Phanariot princes of the Danubian Principalities and dragomans serving in higher posts were expected to be faithful to the Sultan and demonstrate it. For example, in a document discussing of possible candidates to be appointed Prince of Moldavia in 1782, a previous Phanariot prince Konstantinos Mavrokordatos is described in the following manner: "it is known that he has served with fidelity (*sadâkat ile*) to the Sublime State and has fallen prisoner to the Muscovites in Kalas in the first year of the war and has perished in Iaşi as a result of his sorrow"[28]. Fidelity surfaces in discussions of other Phanariots as well. An undated note by Sultan Abdulhamid I (r. 1774-1789) commends the prince of Wallachia for building a ship to transfer supplies to Istanbul: "the aforementioned voyvoda's fidelity (*sadâkat*) to my sublime state is pleasant.

He should be ordered to be faithful (*sadâkat eylemesi*) without forgetting the bread and benefactions [he received from] the Sublime State"[29]. The same terminology emerge in the appointment of Nicholaos Mavroyenis in 1786. The appointment of Mavroyenis was met with resistance from other Phanariots as he was not the dragoman of the Imperial Divan at the time of appointment. In contravention to the long-held practice of appointing the dragomans of the Imperial Divan to the Principalities, the Sultan had appointed Mavroyenis who was the dragoman of the Navy[30]. The document discussing this appointment mentions that Mavroyenis was the better choice as he was expected to show "several times more the fidelity"(*bir kaç kat daha sadâkat göstereceği*) that could be expected from other Phanariots[31]. In short, fidelity (*sadâkat*) was something to be shown in service. This understanding made it the lot of the non-Muslim elite in contrast to submission which was expected of the masses.

Apart from the Phanariots, it seems that the Ottoman officials considered the boyars of the Danubian Principalities as part of a higher class of people. Ottoman documents use the concept of fidelity when they refer to them as well. I will mention two examples here from the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774. The first one is from the official chronicler of the Ottoman army, Sadullah Enveri Efendi, who refers to some boyars of Moldavia who were ready to collaborate with Ottoman armies, as "some [boyars], faithful to the sublime state"(*ba'zı sadâkatkârân-ı devlet-i seniyye*)[32]. Another is an imperial rescript which was directed at the boyars of Moldavia, written after Russian armies took over the territory in 1769. The rescript asks the boyars to return to the Ottoman side and fight against the Russians. It promises "the boyars of the country of Moldavia" protection, only "if you show fidelity(*sadâkat*) and uprightness, and if you are proper subjects (*reâyâ*) of the Sublime State and if you serve and help the soldiers of Islam by kicking out the Muscovites among you"[33]. Here we have another intersection as the boyars, despite their status as nobility in Moldavia, are only subjects (*reâyâ*) in the eyes of the Ottoman government. Still, they seem to be held in higher regard than regular subjects as they are the ones addressed to ensure the removal of Russian soldiers from the territory and their fidelity rather than their submission is expected to achieve this end.

Finally, the Orthodox clergymen can be added to our list of fidelity. Orthodox prelates could support Ottoman military operations in various ways. The Ottoman officials tended to reward such loyalty with promotions circumventing the Patriarchate. One example is a clergyman of undetermined rank named Daniel who was awarded the metropolitan

see of Užice in Serbia for having helped the Ottoman armies in the retaking of Belgrade from the rebels in 1813. A document mentions that he was given the metropolitan see for "his display of fidelity" (*ızhâr-ı sadâkat*)[34].

The expectations from the Patriarchs and metropolitans were also discussed in terms of fidelity, which did not have to be "political". The dismissal of Patriarch Samuel Hatzeris is a good example of this. Samuel was dismissed in November 1768 because "he deviated from the path of fidelity (*sadâkat*) and righteousness and set out to do various tricks, artifices and frauds", as the note about the appointment of his successor tells us[35]. This deviation had nothing to do with foreign powers or local rebellions. Samuel was dismissed because he attempted to govern the Patriarchate by himself, thus angering the metropolitans who composed the Holy Synod. His disloyalty was to the orders of the Sultan which forced him to share Patriarchal power with the Holy Synod[36].

In short, this brief discussion shows that there was a differentiation in Ottoman social hierarchy between non-Muslim elites who held positions in the Ottoman power structure and others who did not, regardless of their economic capabilities. Fidelity, not necessarily a political duty, was expected from the people who served the state, while submission and obedience were the lot of the masses. Fidelity was active, submission and obedience was conceived as passive. Of course, this distinction was not always so clear cut. I tried to provide some examples that could complicate this picture, although the general tendency should be obvious. This tendency was going to be changed with the development of a new understanding of Ottoman society among the Ottoman elite.

A new way of perceiving society, in development

For some Muslim men of letters in Istanbul, the participation of non-Muslims at the highest levels of Ottoman government was not always acceptable. We can see echoes of such discomfort in the writings of 18th century chroniclers. For instance, Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi[37], who completed a chronicle of the Ottoman Empire in 1776, criticized Ottoman Muslim officials for allowing the moneylenders (*sarraf*) of Istanbul to have influence in the running of the Empire. He saw the money-lenders as the cause of "Islam's weakening" (*sâlâbet-i islâmiyenin kesr ve noksanı*) and accused them of being "on friendly terms with belligerent infidels" (*harbi kefereler ile ülfetleri olmak*)[38]. Şemdanizâde did not limit his contempt to the moneylenders but condemned "infidel"

dragomans and private physicians of high-ranking Ottoman Muslims as fifth columns as well[39]. It is interesting that he does not differentiate between these "infidels". He does not refer to them as *Rum*(Orthodox) or *Ermeni* (Armenian) and he never uses the terms *millet* or *tâife* (group) to talk about them as parts of a community. On the other hand, he does not shy away from describing faithful non-Muslims. He defines Manolaki, the ban of Craiova, as a "faithful one (*sadâkat-güzer*) who did not allow the subjects (*reâyâ*) to make allegiance to the Muscovites"[40]. As a lettered man Şemdanizade is more interested in the non-Muslim elite and their effects on the running of the Empire. Though he sees them as infidels and distinct from the Muslims, he does not try to build on this fundamental distinction. For him there are only Muslims and non-Muslims, and only the elite of the non-Muslims merit discussion.

A similar aversion can be seen in Mütercim Asım Efendi, who, in 1820, completed a state-commissioned chronicle for the years between 1804 and 1809. Asım Efendi blamed the fall of Selim III who was dethroned in 1807, on the influence of the Orthodox elite in Ottoman governance. After a long diatribe about how the Jewish vizier of the Ilkhanate ruler Arghun Khan caused the desolation of the Ilkhanate, Asım Efendi makes a connection to the Phanariots and transforms a 13th century poem attacking Jewish influence, to his own context: "O people! Turn *Rum*, turn *Rum* For all the boon is with the *Rum*"[41]. Asım Efendi's influential non-Muslims are not simply "infidels", they are also *Rum*. Although he had the same concern of denouncing non-Muslim influence in elite circles, he differed from Şemdanizade quite significantly in the terminology he employed. Şemdanizade had never used the word *millet* to refer to a group of Ottoman population, be them Muslim or non-Muslim. He also does not talk about groups of people except Muslims and infidels. On the other hand, Asım Efendi talks about Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities *in toto* employing the word *tâife*(group)[42]. *Millet* in his chronicle is used to describe the French after the Revolution[43], and the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as a united block.

In fact, Asım Efendi provides a translation of Napoleon's declarations to Egyptian Muslims during his Invasion of 1798 and relates that it was translated later to Turkish to be disseminated by the French ambassador in Istanbul. However, he argues, "they [the French] could not comprehend and reason that such delirium by triflers will not bring discord amongst the Muslims (*İslâmiyân*) as the unifying direction of religion make the *millet* of Islam indivisible"[44]. Asım Efendi not only uses *millet* as a community created by religion that is the foundation of the Ottoman state, but he

also puts it against the French attempts to create discord through the use of modern concepts such as *nation*.

In Şemdanizade and Asım, we have two ends of a process. They were writing at the two edges of the time frame of this article and their use of concepts point to a clear transformation in defining communities, and in creating unified population groups in discourse if not in reality. This transformation was the result of the late 18th century crisis. Its development can be better appreciated in the writings of Ottoman authors like Ebubekir Ratib Efendi who lived through the turmoil of late 18th century.

Ebubekir Ratib Efendi was an Ottoman statesman and diplomat who was sent to Vienna to ratify the treaty of Sistova in 1791. He was ordered to look for ways to improve Ottoman relations with the Habsburgs, and perhaps more importantly, to examine Austrian institutions and to report on them to help Sultan Selim III's burgeoning reform effort[45]. He stayed in Vienna parts of 1791 and 1792, a very opportune time to be part of debates surrounding the French Revolution. He wrote his report sometime between his return to Istanbul in 1792 and his appointment as chief scribe (*reis-ül-küttâb*), an office responsible for Ottoman foreign policy among other things, in 1795. In his report, he took on the idea of nation (*millet* in Ottoman Turkish). According to Ratib Efendi as explained by Fatih Yeşil:

> "[…] rather than being the sole source of sovereignty as used after the French Revolution, *millet* was a given that was organized through the performance of power by the sultan and his representatives, it was a passive as acted upon by the actors. For him, the duty of the *millet* was to obey[…] In fact, divine wisdom and natural order required the submission of the *millet*"[46].

Ratib Efendi was trying to bring the new concept closer to his and his readers' worldview and terminology, understanding and rejecting what *nation* was. This understanding was later utilized by Ottoman officials in their discussions with foreign powers. Ottoman neutrality during the War of the First Coalition (1792 – 1797) allowed Ottoman officials to be receptive to the new way of organizing societies and international relations emanating from France. The Ottomans, unlike other European monarchies, were very quick to recognize treaties made between the Ottoman Sultan and the French King, as applying to the French nation[47]. This is significant not only for the conduct of diplomacy. It is the implicit acceptation that a King, and by extension a Sultan, is the representative of a *nation* and is making treaties in his capacity as a representative. On the Ottoman side, this *nation* could only be defined in religious terms, it

was the *millet* of Islam. A clear use of this new concept can be seen in the Ottoman declaration of war against France in 1798 after the invasion of Egypt[48]. Probably from the pen of *reis-ül-küttâb* Atıf Efendi, the declaration makes a connection with French desires in Italy and Egypt and attempts to turn around the discourse of "nations" by using the word *millet* in its religious connotation:

> "It is obvious and clear that [France was aiming at] making the republic of France the mother of republics by founding many little republics as she had in Italy and arranging affairs everywhere as she desires and controlling the entire affairs of [these] republics. Now, Egypt is the door to the two noble sanctuaries [in Mecca and Medina], and this is an important topic relating to the entire Islamic *millet*"[49].

This is very similar to Mütercim Asım Efendi's approach to French declarations in Turkish. Ottoman foreign-policy makers are turning around the use of the concept of *nation* to create a denial of the creation of little republics belonging to different groups of people. The *millet* in Islam can only be the entirety of it, so any strife for the creation of a republic based on a *nation* is futile. More importantly for this discussion, an Islamic *millet* is constructed at the center of Ottoman polity through which a declaration of war is legitimized. If the center was taken by the *millet* of Islam in an era when the term had already acquired its meaning as a *nation* tied to a territory, this had the potential to turn the Ottoman polity into the polity of Muslims, as different from an Islamic polity. If the Ottoman state was starting to identify its center with its Muslim populations, what about the populations that were pushed to the margins?

Talking about non-Muslims in an age of transformation

When Ratib Efendi was in Vienna, one of the topics he discussed with polite society was his perception of the lack of religious differentiation among servants of European states. Talking about officers serving monarchs of different countries than their own, Ratib Efendi asked whether "zeal for fatherland (*gayret-i vatan*) and the matter of religion and sect would not prevent their fidelity (*sadâkat*)"[50]. Ratib Efendi tells us that his interlocutors responded by pointing to wars of religion in Europe which caused too much bloodshed. Due to this carnage in the name of religion, it was now forbidden to talk about religious differences in any European state. Ratib Efendi was in Vienna at a time that was close enough to the debates in Europe around enlightened absolutism and religious toleration. Questions regarding religion was thought to

be central to the 18th century debates. In the words of Derek Beales, "Voltaire, the arch-priest of the French Enlightenment, agreed with Kant, the greatest figure of the German *Aufklärung*, that at the heart of Enlightenment lay questions of religion; and the great rulers who are known as Enlightened shared their opinion"[51]. Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor, 1765-1790) who had died two years prior to Ratib's mission had changed his mother's policies concerning non-Catholics, which he found "unjust, impious, impossible, harmful, ridiculous"[52]. His edicts came with many limitations, and sometimes toleration was an attempt towards assimilation, but they still went much further than any other Catholic state. In some circumstances, Greek Orthodox, Lutherans, Calvinists and Jews were allowed to run their own schools, take up hitherto restricted occupations and even hold office[53].

It is possible that Ratib Efendi's interlocutors were not referring to the situation in Europe except as a point of comparison. It might have been a diplomatic way to tell Ratib Efendi of the perceived failures of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire had been condemned repeatedly in Enlightenment circles, from Montesquieu to Voltaire, for perceived despotism and failure to tolerate its Christian populations. Russia had responded to the Ottoman declaration of war in 1768 using this argument, declaring to the Christians of the Empire that "every day these impious blasphemers of our holy faith, violate and defile our pure sacraments; demolish and convert to the impure worship of Muhammad the holy temples, and do not stop stealing from the bosom of the Holy Church her children"[54]. Many of the Russian declarations during the Ottoman-Russian War circulated in Enlightenment circles[55].

It must be in such a connection that Ratib Efendi's hosts started talking about the Ottoman Empire, lamenting the inability of non-Muslim Ottomans to renovate their ruined churches, adding that "many wealthy merchants from Ottoman islands like Chios, Cyprus, Rhodes and Kos came and settled here"[56]. They also gave the example of Moscopole, which suffered immensely from sacking by Muslim Albanian irregulars since 1770s and whose inhabitants came and settled in Habsburg domains. Ratib Efendi tells us that he asked others about the issue and verified what was being told to him[57]. In fact, he mentions "numerous group of people" that settled in a region on the Austrian side, twenty hours away from the Ottoman city of Belgrade, who "could not bear any longer the oppression and injustice" in Rumelia, but as their "original fatherland" (*vatan-ı aslileri*) was the lands of Islam, they showed "zeal for fatherland" (*vatan gayreti*) and helped him in his mission by relaying news[58].

In another episode some Ottoman non-Muslim merchants complained to him over their non-protection. He was told that after Maria Theresa, the Ottoman *reâyâ* and merchants in Austria suffered many injustices. "Even now our situation is terrible, we have some interests here otherwise we would have left long ago. Do something about this situation since you are an ambassador here. Their ambassadors in Istanbul get so much done"[59]. He thought there was nothing that he could do, though the fact that he mentions the situation making a comparison to European ambassadors in the Ottoman capital might be taken as his belief in the necessity of their protection as Ottoman subjects.

In Ratib Efendi's writing the classical Ottoman idea of providing justice to the *reâyâ* to keep them in their place is mingled with more modern ideas like "zeal for fatherland". He sees no problem with juxtaposing the fidelity (*sadâkat*) of European military officers with Ottoman *reâyâ* who end up leaving the Empire; potentially going beyond the standard expectation of submission (*raiyyet - itâat*). There is no question for him that the Empire is the fatherland of these non-Muslims who live in Austria, and it is almost natural for them to help the ambassador out of their zeal for their fatherland (*vatan gayreti*). So, with Ratib Efendi we have a discussion of non-Muslims potentially occupying a place in the center of Ottoman polity without being marginalized as a fifth column, with similar expectations regardless of their position in the social hierarchy or proximity to the palace and the state.

Not everyone would agree though. Mehmed Emin Behic Efendi,Ottoman state official, entrepreneur and owner of a paper mill, wrote a report for Selim III titled *Inspirations from Memorandums* (*Sevânihu'l-Levâyih*) in 1803. In the report, he lamented the influence of non-Muslims in Ottoman trade and proposed measures against them. His proposals on a wide-range of fields from trade to security, mention the necessity of the "consideration of the requirements of realm (*mülk*) and society (*millet*)" by state officials[60] while promoting the strict enforcement of the requirements of Islamic law on society and the community of Muslims (*millet ü ümmet*)[61]. By his discussion of the enforcement of Islamic law, he makes it clear that he is using *millet* in the sense of Ottoman society only for Muslims, creating a basic differentiation in terms of who was constituting the Empire. He does not stop there though and goes on to take this differentiation to policy. He argues, for example, that the state should strive to "produce numerous translators for every language from the community of Islam to be relieved from needing strangers (*bigâne*)" for the translation of European books on history, warfare and politics[62].

Translations of official documents and European books in the Empire were done by Phanariot dragomans, recruited from among the Orthodox subjects of the Empire. Behic Efendi not only does not trust them but refers to them as *bigâne*, i.e. strangers, even foreigners.

Moreover, his contempt for the non-Muslim influence goes beyond the elite. He refers to *reâyâ* in a discussion about the rising power of local elites as "similar to senseless and mindless savages who incline towards whatever direction they are led"[63]. It might be argued that he is referring to *reâyâ* in the older sense of all tax-paying subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim. However, he refers to the "the lowest nomad among Muslims" as cleverer than "the smartest of the Franks" in the same text. Given his contempt for non-Muslims, it is plausible to argue that he is using *reâyâ* for non-Muslims following the utilization of the word in his time[64]. Behic Efendi believed strongly in social differentiation, arguing that it was a waste of time to educate sons of commoners for state service as they would never attain the same level with those who were from families that were already in state service[65]. When it came to condemning non-Muslims though, he does not seem to draw such social lines.

Probably because he was an entrepreneur, he reserved his most scathing rebukes to non-Muslim merchants. In one part he claims that the measures he proposes about trade and merchants would result in the "complete correction of the traitorous *reâyâ* (*reâyâhainleri*) who dare to openly betray (*ihânet*) the Sublime State"[66]. These merchants "who made a habit of desiring ever new enameled stuff to be brought to subvert the Sublime State" were on the same side with "Frankish" merchants according to him[67]. In yet another section, he describes non-Muslim merchants as "traitorous coddling moths (*iç kurdu hainler*) who look faithful (*suret-i sadâkatda*) but whose dearest wish is to prevent the Sublime State from acquiring strength"[68]. Ottoman documents were already referring to *reâyâ* rebels as *hain* (traitor) by late 18th century, but Behic Efendi broadened the use of the term by applying it to merchants he described in very aggressive terms. Thus, the concept of treason is linked to something more than submission to the state and becomes the opposite of fidelity which can be breached in various ways, not limited to open rebellion. Moreover, it is used for non-Muslim Ottomans who are not state servants. In the last quotation provided here, he uses the concept of fidelity to describe the responsibilities of non-Muslim merchants who were certainly not state officials. The terms used to describe their relationship to the Ottoman polity already went from submission to fidelity with new expectations and condemnations attached, turning these populations into a security problem as well.

Behic Efendi emphasized this aspect of security in a section he titled "about the order of vagabonds and inhabitants of Istanbul". One of the proposals he makes to ensure security in the capital is to "be especially careful" of *reâyâ* neighborhoods and use "special spies" to "search and investigate" these places. Moreover, the inhabitants of these neighborhoods were to be recorded in registers by their Patriarchs and the imams of their neighborhoods, they were to provide guarantors (*kefîl*) and they had to be inspected once a week[69].

The different experiences of these two very interesting Ottoman statesmen resulted in their very different approaches to state and society. They were trying to deal with a major challenge of their time, defining sociopolitical roles in a transforming late 18th century Empire and imagining a core population for it. These two different trends, one more receptive to non-Muslim populations, the other more exclusivist did not remain on paper. They were taken up to be applied at different times with differing degrees of success.

When policies are made

Behic Efendi had reason to be so negative about non-Muslim merchants of the Empire. Many non-Muslim merchants were under European protection, hoisting European flags and paying reduced tariffs, a fact duly condemned by him[70]. This was a concern for the Ottoman state as well, as it harmed the Empire economically and created a group of Ottoman subjects who were out of the state's control. The plan devised by Selim III and his advisors was quite different from Behic Efendi's propositions though. The Ottoman state offered certain privileges to non-Muslim ship owners rather than trying to create a Muslim merchant fleet[71]. This move was also in line with the state transformation projects of Selim III, and enabled him to extend the state's control over society and to enforce its claim to control social mobility[72]. In many ways, by according privileges to protect Greek merchants in the Mediterranean through Ottoman consuls in European ports, Selim III was answering the complaints of Ottoman non-Muslim merchants in Vienna who came to Ratib Efendi to complain about their situation. However, the construction of a well-armed Greek merchant fleet to ensure safety in dangerous waters backfired in 1821 with the Greek Revolution, as part of this fleet joined the rebellion against Ottoman power[73].

Changing the tide, the Greek Revolution allowed the Ottoman center to identify the entire Greek Orthodox population of the Empire

as suspicious, while also underlining the nature of Ottoman polity as a polity of the Muslims. The rebels were defined in generalizing terms as "the *Rum milleti*, in whose seditious hearts various wiles and treasons had been circulating for many years, who made it clear that they were despisers of Islam"[74]. *Rum milleti*, a term that developed in late 18th century, was used to define the Greek Orthodox faithful in the Empire as a religious group that encompassed the Empire with the Patriarch at its head[75]. At the same time, it also had the meaning of "the Greek nation" in its modern sense, allowing the Ottoman officials in the capital to identify the rebels with the Orthodox faithful everywhere in the Empire and to take preventive measures against them[76].

On the other hand, the Ottoman center used religion in the context of the Greek Revolution, "to create a more corporate Muslim-Ottoman identity which did not allow much for 'internal' dissension"[77]. The aim of the rebels was thus defined as "trampling the Islamic *millet*"[78] in a "general alliance and union in order to fool and betray the religion and state of Muhammad and the generous *millet* of Ahmed"[79]. The propositions of Behic Efendi for cataloguing non-Muslim populations in the capital started making more sense in this context.

In fact, one of the first things Ottoman authorities did after they learnt about the rebellion in the Danubian Principalities and the participation of Alexandros Ypsilantis, the son of a former Phanariot Orthodox prince of Wallachia, was to order the survey of non-Muslim populations in the capital and their recording in registers together with their guarantors to be organized by the Patriarchate[80]. Moreover, *Rum milleti* was defined as a monolithic group regardless of their social differences which allowed the Ottoman authorities to take measures as they saw fit. For example, when Ottoman *chargés d'affaires* in European capitals were dismissed by Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), the argument he used was that they could not be trusted as they belonged to the *Rum milleti*[81]. The same applied to the sailors who were removed from service in the Navy by the *Kapudan Pasha*, as "there could be no trust in the *Rum milleti*"[82]. Many of the measures Behic Efendi proposed became a reality in this time of crisis. The Ottoman Empire became the Empire of Muslims rather than an Islamic Empire; the rebellion against the state was taken to mean a betrayal against the Islamic *millet* as well as the Ottoman state. The *Rum* were defined as a socially monolithic group devoid of socio-economic and geographical differences, against whom blanket policies could be developed. They were also more than *zimmî*, as the term *millet* had already acquired a modern meaning. It is still too early to use the concept

"minority" to define Ottoman Orthodox populations; but the tools were already in development.

Conclusion

The learned Muslim elite of Istanbul had lively discussions in late 18th and early 19th centuries around the position of the non-Muslims in the Empire. These debates came on top of internal as well as international developments. Ottomans felt the need to elaborate their position on questions of society after the French Revolution and the rise of ideologies that based themselves on population groups. Selim III's reform efforts created an internal demand for such ideas as well. The results were as diverse as the positions of Ebubekir Ratib Efendi and Mehmed Emin Behic Efendi. Administrative documentation points to the fact that such ideas did not remain on paper. They were taken up to create policies that could be exact opposites depending on the needs of the time. These ebbs and flows continued into the 19th century under Mahmud II's rule (1808-1838) and beyond.

It seems that the Sultan himself was aware of these trends. An illuminating example is his note on a document in the first year of the Greek War of Independence. The undated report should be dated to 1821 according to internal evidence. It is about the removal of a certain *dervish* called Haydar Baba from the janissary quarters because he was suspected for being an Iranian spy. The Greek War of Independence was under way and a war with Iran had just started. The Ottoman state needed the janissaries on its side and had no tolerance for a suspected spy amidst the corps. After a long description of the discussions with the janissaries, the report tells of a bizarre request made by them. The janissaries argue that there were too many Armenians and *Rum* in the capital, and they did not feel safe from them in case of a war with an external enemy. They ask for the removal of these non-Muslims or their massacre by the state or permission for the janissaries to massacre all of them. Mahmud II in his note explains that "it is obvious that no one from the *Rum milleti* can be trusted, but I cannot order them [the janissaries] to kill this many *reâyâ* without knowing the Islamic ruling on the issue as our sublime state is a Muhammedan state and the submission of the people(*halk*) to my imperial self is because I am the leader of the Muslims"[83].

The Sultan's note is summarizing the developments in the last decades and gives us a window to the Sultan's perception of his and his subjects' positions vis-à-vis each other. The Ottoman state is Muhammedan (*devlet-i*

Muhammediye) meaning that it is an Islamic state, but the Sultan is the leader (*imam*) of Muslims. He makes it clear that people (*halk*) submit to him because he is the leader of the Muslims. There is an inkling of the idea of representation here, Mahmud is the leader of the Muslims and hence he must respect Islamic law. He does not ask what happens if not, but it is implicitly clear. The Muslim population could find another, as they recently did so with his uncle, Selim III, and his brother, Mustafa IV, both of whom were dethroned by Istanbul's populations[84]. Moreover, he seems to define his population as Muslims, differentiating between *halk* (population) and *reâyâ*. In the same breath, we see the *Rum milleti* defined as entirely faithless to the state.

The discourses on the Ottoman state and society did not settle after this point. Far from it, what being an Ottoman was and how to define Ottoman populations oscillated between approaches that expended on those of Ratib Efendi and Behic Efendi. Even Mahmud II was to calm down after a few years into the Greek Revolution. As one historian explains, he might have gone as far as saying: "Je ne veux reconnaître désormais les musulmans qu'à la mosquée, les chrétiens qu'à l'église et les juifs qu'à la synagogue"[85]. Still, however they were defined, non-Muslims were no longer expected to simply submit and avoid rebellion. Fidelity, which was reserved to only the elite until late 18th century became an expectation from everyone. As a result, treason was defined in more general terms than taking up arms. Hence, the tools that allowed the creation of "majorities" and "minorities" did not pop up in early 20th century with sudden European intervention; they were already in development as early as the turn of the 19th century parallel to and in touch with European developments. The Ottoman Empire, after all, had always been a part of European developments.

Notes

1. This research was made possible through funding from the Fonds de Recherche du Québec-Société et Culture. I would like to thank my anonymous reviewers for their comments. The sources and names in Ottoman Turkish are rendered in Latin letters following Ferit Devellioğlu's system: F. Devellioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lûgat*, Aydın Kitabevi, Ankara 1988.

2. Cl. Cahen, *Dhimma*, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, ed. by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 06 May 2018 <http://dx.doi.org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_1823>.

3. Various aspects of Muslim-Christian relationships have been studied by Ottoman historians. For early modern period see among others: A. Cohen, *Jewish life under Islam: Jerusalem in the sixteenth century*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1984; R.

C. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571-1640*, New York University Press, New York 1993; R. Gradeva, *Orthodox Christians in the kadi courts: The practice of the Sofia sheriat court, seventeenth century*, in "Islamic Law and Society", IV, n. 1, 1997 pp. 37-69; H. Gerber, *Muslims and zimmis in Ottoman economy and society: Encounters, culture, and knowledge*, in *Studies in Ottoman social and economic life*, ed. by R. Motika, C. Herzog, M. Ursinus, Heidelberger Orientverlag, Heidelberg 1999, pp. 99-124; M. Greene, *A shared world: Christians and Muslims in the early modern Mediterranean*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000. For the modern period, see among others: N. Doumanis, *Before the nation: Muslim-Christian coexistence and its destruction in Late Ottoman Anatolia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013; M. U. Campos, *Ottoman brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in early twentieth-century Palestine*, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA) 2011; S. Deringil, *Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015.

4. S. Faroqhi, *Raʿiyya*, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, cit. Consulted online on 22 May 2018 <http://dx.doi.org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0905>.

5. *Ibid*. However, as Alexandar Fotić has warned we should not automatically read *reâyâ* as non-Muslim in the 18th century: A. Fotić, *Tracing the origin of a new meaning of the term Reʿāyā in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Balkans*, in "Balcanica" n. 48, 2017, pp. 55-66.

6. On the Phanariot complex of late 18th and early 19th centuries, see: C. Philliou, *Biography of an empire: governing Ottomans in an age of revolution*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2011.

7. E. Gara, *Conceptualizing interreligious relations in the Ottoman Empire: The early modern centuries*, in "Acta Poloniae Historica", n. 116, 2017, pp. 57-91, at pp. 66-72.

8. H. A. R. Gibb, H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the West: A study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East*, 2 vols., Oxford University Press, London 1950-1957.

9. B. Braude, *Foundation myths of the millet system,* in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The functioning of a plural society*, ed. by B. Braude and B. Lewis, Holmes and Meier, New York 1982, pp. 69-88.

10. M. Ursinus, *Zur Diskussion um "millet" im Osmanischen Reich*, in "Südost-Forschungen", n. 48, 1989, pp. 195-207. See also: M. Ursinus, *Millet*, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, cit. Consulted online on 28 April 2018 http://dx.doi.org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0741. Ursinus defines three meanings for the concept «religion, religious community, and nation».

11. P. Konortas, *From Tā'ife to Millet: Ottoman terms for the Ottoman Greek orthodox community*, in *Ottoman Greeks in the age of nationalism: Politics, economy, and society in the nineteenth century*, ed. by D. Gondicas, C. Issawi, The Darwin Press, Princeton (NJ) 1999, pp. 169-79.

12. A. Hadjikyriacou, *Beyond the millet debate: The theory and practice of communal representation in Pre-tanzimat-era Cyprus*, in *Political thought and practice in The Ottoman Empire: Halcyon days in Crete IX: A symposium held in Rethymno 9-11 January 2015*, ed. by M. Sariyannis, Crete University Press, Rethymno 2019, pp. 71-96.

13. R. Koselleck, *Futures past: On the semantics of historical time*, transl. Keith Tribe, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

15. A. E. Topal, E. Wigen, *Ottoman conceptual history challenges and prospects*, in "Contributions to the History of Concepts", XIV, n. 1, 2019, pp. 93-114.

16. I have Alexandra Lianeri's conceptualization of translation in mind: "Translation does not belong. Although it is written in a certain language, time, and situation, translation offers itself as outside, at the frontier between different languages and times, neither

apparent nor present, but obscure and receding". A. Lianeri, *A regime of untranslatables: Temporalities of translation and conceptual history*, in "History and Theory", LIII, n. 4, December 2014, p. 473.

17. For a discussion of the term nation see: P. Nora, *Nation*, in *Dictionnaire Critique de La Revolution Française*, éds. F. Furet, M. Ozouf, Flammarion, Paris 1988, pp. 801-12 and L. Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London 2003.

18. *Ibid*., p. 476.

19. E. Kedourie, *Ethnicity, majority and minority in the Middle East*, in *Ethnicity, pluralism and the state in the Middle East*, ed. by M.J. Esman, I. Malinovich, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988, p. 27.

20. B.T. White, *The emergence of minorities in the Middle East: The politics of community in French Mandate Syria*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2011, p. 37.

21. P. Sluglett, *From millet to minority: Another look at the Non-Muslim communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries*, in *Minorities and the Arab world: New perspectives*, ed. by L. Robson, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse (NY) 2016, pp. 19-38.

22. BOA, A. DVNSMHM (Mühimme Defteri) 168, pp. 75-6, n. 277, Evail Şaban 1183 (30 November-9 December 1769): "ol havâlîye vaz'-ı kademle nuhûset eyleyen Moskovlu ve Boğdanlu eğer bunlara mütâbaat eylemiş Eflaklu var ise sâir itâatde olan reâyâ-yı Eflak'a taaruz olunmamak üzere ancak itâatden hurûc ile asker-i İslâm'a mukabeleye cesâret ider hâin ve haydûd var ise kahr u tedmîr (…)".

23. BOA, A. SMST 369 / 29304, 13 Zilkade 1184 (28 February 1771): "her kim makâm-ı raiyyette sabit kadem olur ise eyyâm-ı devlet-i padişâhîde me'mûlünden ziyâde himâyet ve ikrâm olunarak düşmen yedinden çekilen mihnet ve meşakkate mükâfat olunacağı (…)". The Orlov revolt was a revolt organized by a division of the Russian navy led by Admiral Alexei Orlov, which traveled all the way from the Baltic to Eastern Mediterranean. On the Orlov revolts see: E. Smilyanskaya, *"Protection" or "possession": How Russians created a Greek principality in 1770-1775*, in *Power and influence in South-Eastern Europe, 16th-19th century*, eds. M. Baramova, P. Mitev, I. Parvev, V. Racheva, Lit, Zürich-Berlin 2013, pp. 209-20. On the Ottoman perception of the revolt see: Y. Nagata, *Greek rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula: Some remarks through the Turkish historical source* in *Studies on the social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Y. Nagata, Akademi Kitabevi, Izmir 1995, pp. 103-18.

24. BOA, A. DVN 2370/11: "câdde-i raiyyete duhûl ile her hâlde devlet-i aliyyeme itâat ve inkıyâd üzere olub ba'de-l-yevm emniyyet ve sadâkat üzere hareket ve hidmet ideceklerini tahrîr itmeleriyle (…)".

25. BOA, HAT 267/15525, Undated (catalogue date: 1204/1789-1790): "rüsûm-ı raiyyetden ve dâire-i itâatden çıkmamaları (…)".

26. BOA, HAT 203/10158, Undated (catalogue date: 1210/ 1794-1795): "reâyânın istimâletleri ve câdde-i itâatden adem-i inhirâfları esbâbının istihsâline ikdâm itmesi Rum Patrikine tenbîh ve te'kîd olunmak (…)".

27. "BOA, HAT 131/5424, Undated: "reâyânın bu mahzarda yazdıkları istid'âları ve şurût menhec-i raiyyetden çıkub bir cumhûrluk sûretini kesb eylemek ma'nâsını müvehhem (…)".

28. In İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *On sekizinci asırda Buğdana voyvoda tayini*, in "Tarih Semineri Dergisi", v. I, 1937, p. 35: "devlet-i aliyyeye sadâkat ile hizmet edüp hatta seferin ibtidâ senesi Kalas'da Moskoflu yedine esir düşmekle Yaşda kederinden helâk olduğu cümleye malûmdur".

29. BOA, HAT 19/885, Undated: "voyvoda-i mersûmun Devlet-i Aliyye hakkında sadâkati güzel. Hemen nân ve ni'met-i Devlet-i Aliyye'yi fimâba'd ferâmûş etmeyerek dahi sadâkat eylemesi için tenbîh oluna".

30. On N. Mavroyenis and his activities, see: Philliou, *Biography of an empire*, cit., pp. 43-9; S. Laiou, *Between pious generosity and faithful service to the Ottoman State: the Vakıf of Nikolaos Mavrogenis, End of the eighteenth century*, in "Turkish Historical Review", a. VI, n. 2, 2015, pp. 151-74.

31. BOA, HAT 1450/44, Undated.

32. M.S. Çalışkan (ed.), *Vekâyinüvis Enverî Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildi'nin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188 / 1768-1774)*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Marmara University, 2000, p. 82.

33. BOA, A. DVNSMHM (Mühimme Defteri) 168, pp. 42-3, n. 155, Evahir Cemaziyelahir 1183 (22-31 October 1769): "İmdi, Boğdan memleketi boyarlarına, eğer sadâkat ve istikâmet idüp, Devlet-i aliyyenin reâyâsı iseniz içinizde olan Moskovluyu ihrâc etmekde asker-i İslâma hidmet ve iânet ederler ise kendülere emân virülür".

34. BOA, A.DVN 2471/22, 17 Şaban 1232 (2 July 1817).

35. BOA, KK_d 2542/17, 138, 1 Receb 1182 (11 November 1768): "Patrik-i sâbık Samuil nâm râhib meslek-i sadâkat ve istikâmetten münharifen envâ'-i dekk ve hîl ve tezvirâta tasaddî (…)".

36. On the inclusion of the Holy Synod in the running of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople in the 18th century, see: P. Konortas, *Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο-Βεράτια για τους προκαθήμενους της Μεγάλης Εκκλησίας 17ος – αρχές 20ού αιώνα* [*Ottoman views of the Ecumenical Patriarchate –Berats for the Head of the Great Church, 17th – beginning of 20th centuries*], Alexandria Pub., Athens 1998, pp. 134-47.

37. Şemdanizade was not commissioned to write a chronicle by the Ottoman government. He explained that he had written the chronicle due to his interest in history. He was an educated Ottoman who served as a *kadı* (judge) in different parts of the Ottoman Empire throughout his career. Şem'dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'i't-Tevârih*, vol. I, ed. by M. Aktepe, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yay, İstanbul 1976, p. xviii.

38. *Ibid.*, vol. II/A, p. 69.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

40. *Ibid.*, vol. II/B, p. 2: "Karayiova Banı Manolaki nâm şahs sadâkat-güzer olmağla re'âyâyı Moskov'a teba'iyyet ettirmedi".

41. M. Asım Efendi, *Âsım Efendi Tarihi (Osmanlı Tarihi 1218-1224/1804-1809)*, ed. by Z. Yılmazer, Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, Istanbul, 2015, p. 638: "Terevvemû terevvemû yâ enâmü / Fe-inne fi'r-Rûmi cemi'a'l-merâmi".

42. For some examples for *Rum*: *ibid.*, p. 647, *ibid.*, v.2, pp. 747, 972; for Armenians: *ibid.*, v. 1, p. 347, *ibid.*, v. 2, p. 1232.

43. *Ibid.*, v. 1, pp. 271, 272, 341, 622.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 624: "Lâkin millet-i İslâmiyye'yi cihet-i câmi'a-i dîniyye yek-laht eylemekle, bu makûle herze-kârâne hezeyân, tefrîka-bahş-i miyâne-i İslâmiyân olmadığını derk ü iz'ân eylemezler".

45. There is a relatively recent work on this very interesting Ottoman diplomat in Turkish: F. Yeşil, *Aydınlanma çağında bir Osmanlı kâtibi Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (1750-1799)*, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, İstanbul 2011. Yeşil also penned a number of English articles on him, see among others: Id., *Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's observations*, in "Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies", vol. LXX, n. 2, 2007, pp. 283-304; Id., *How to be(come) an Ottoman at the End of the Eighteenth Century*, in "The Journal of Ottoman Studies", vol. XLIV, 2014, pp. 123-39.

46. Id., *Aydınlanma çağında bir Osmanlı kâtibi*, cit., pp. 217-8. Translation is mine.

47. P. Firges, *French revolutionaries in the Ottoman empire: Diplomacy, political culture,*

and the limiting of universal revolution, 1792-1798, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017, p. 82.

48. For Ottoman attitudes on the French invasion of Egypt, see: H. Sarıkaya, *Mısır'ın İşgali (1798-1801) Karşısında Osmanlı İdaresi ve Toplumu*, in *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Odağında Tarih Boyunca Savaş*, ed. by M. Ünver, M. Tanrıverdi, Hiper Yayın, İstanbul 2018, pp. 453-77. The author seems to reproduce the story of the "unexpected" invasion of Egypt and the Ottoman shock and unpreparedness. For a study that explores Ottoman expectations of an imminent French invasion of an undetermined Ottoman territory see: K. Şakul, *An Ottoman global moment: War of the Second Coalition in the Levant*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2009.

49. BOA, HAT 268/15563, Undated: "İtalya'da itdikleri gibi cemâhir-i sağire-i kesîre ihdâs idüb Fransa cumhûrı ümmi'l-cemâhir olarak her mahalde didiği vech üzere hall ü akd-i umûr ve umûmen fetk u retk-i masâlih-i cumhûr itmek olduğu celî ve âşikârdır imdi Mısr bâb-ı Haremeyn-i muhteremeyn olub bu husûs bi'l-cümle millet-i İslâmiyyeye râcî bir mâdde-i cesîme olduğundan(…)".

50. S. V. Arıkan, *Nizâm-ı Cedit'in Kaynaklarından Ebubekir Ratib Efendi'nin "Büyük Lâyihası"*, unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 1996, p. 20: "Ve vatan gayreti ve dîn ü mezheb ciheti sadâkatlerine mâni' olmaz mı?".

51. D. Beales, *Social forces and enlightened policies*, in *Enlightened absolutism: Reform and reformers in later eighteenth century Europe*, ed. by Hamish M. Scott, Macmillan IX, Basingstoke 1990, p. 41.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

53. On enlightened absolutism and religious toleration see: *ibid.*, pp. 37-54; Id., *Enlightenment and reform in eighteenth-century Europe*, I.B. Tauris, New York-London 2005, pp. 6-27; C. H. O'Brien, *Ideas of religious toleration at the time of Joseph II. A study of the enlightenment among catholics in Austria*, in "Transactions of the American Philosophical Society", vol. LIX, n. 7, 1969, pp. 1-80.

54. I am using the document as published in P. Kontogiannis, *Οι Έλληνες κατά τον πρώτον επί Αικατερίνης Β Ρωσσοτουρκικόν Πόλεμον 1768-1774* [*The Greeks during the First Russo-Turkish War under Catherine II, 1768-1774*], Sakellariou, Athens 1903, pp. 461-3. The translation is mine.

55. Some of the Russian propaganda was penned by Voltaire himself. See: A. Camariano-Cioran, *La guerre russo-turque de 1768-1774 et les Grecs*, in "Revue des études sud-est européennes", vol. 3, n. 3-4, 1965, pp. 530-1. For the Italian enlightenment's reaction to Catherine II's propaganda on Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire see: F. Venturi, *The end of the old regime in Europe: 1768-1776: The first crisis*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1989, pp. 3-73.

56. Arıkan, *Nizâm-ı Cedit'in Kaynaklarından*, cit., p. 21.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 396-7.

60. A. O. Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic'in Sevanihü'l-Levayih'i ve Değerlendirmesi*, unpublished MA dissertation, Marmara University, 1992, pp. 13, 20.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-9: "bîgâneye ihtiyacdan vareste olmak içün ehl-i İslamdan her lisanda müte'addid mütercimler peyda olması esbabına himmet".

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5: "manende-i vuhuş-ı bi-şuur ve bi-huş oldıklarına mebni kangı canibe sevk olunurlar ise ol tarafa meyl iderler".

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-8

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 69: "Devlet-i 'aliyyenin kesb-i kuvvet itmemesi aksa-yı merâmları olup sûret-i sadâkatda görinen iç kurdu hâ'inlerden".

69. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 57: "those who acquire royal diplomas with inappropriate conditions with the intention of … paying three percent tariff" (*yüzde üç gümük vireyim … daiyyesiyle bir takrib şurutı nâ-müsaid berat-ı şerif tahsil iden*).

71. G. Harlaftis, S. Laiou, *Ottoman state policy in Mediterranean trade and shipping c. 1780-c.1820: The rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman merchant fleet*, in *Networks of power in modern Greece: Essays in honour of John Campbell*, ed. by. M. Mazower, Hurst & Company, London 2008, p. 20.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

74. BOA, A.DVN 2508/61, 11 Receb 1236 (15 April 1821): "vâfir senelerden beru kulûb-ı fâsidelerinde envâ'-ı mekâir ve hıyânet cevelân eden Rum milletinin dahi bu bâbda mühîn-i İslâm oldukları nümâyân oldığı".

75. Konortas, *From Tâ'ife to Millet*, cit.

76. Orders were sent as far as Baghdad and as deep as the mines in Keban asking local officials to be careful about the Orthodox populations living under their control. See: BOA, HAT 1343/52476, Undated (catalogue date: 1237 – 1821/1822) and BOA, A.DVN 2517/57, 21 Rebiülahir 1237 (15 January 1822).

77. H. Erdem, *"Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural labourers": Ottoman responses to the Greek War of Independence*, in *Citizenship and the nation-state in Greece and Turkey*, ed. by F. Birtek and T. Dragonas,, Routledge, London 2009, p. 67.

78. BOA, A. DVNSMHM (Mühimme Defteri) 239, p. 17, n.72, (Evail Receb 1236 /4-14 April 1821).

79. BOA, A.DVN 2517/57, 21 Rebiülahir 1237 (15 January 1822): "din ü devlet-i Muhammediyye ve millet-i semîha-yı Ahmediyye hakkında icrâ-yı mekr ü hıyânete umûmî müttefik ve müttehid olduklarına binâen". Ahmed is another name of the Prophet.

80. BOA, HAT 1294/50524, Undated (catalogue date: 1236/ 1820-1821). One of these registers can be found at: BOA, NFS. d 8.

81. Erdem, "*Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural labourers"*, cit., p. 74.

82. *Ibid.*

83. BOA, HAT 284/17078, Undated (1821): "Rum milletinden hiçbir ferdin emniyeti olmadığı zâhirdir kaldı ki devlet-i aliyyemiz devlet-i Muhammediyye olup zât-ı hümâyûnuma halkın itâati imam-ı müslimîn olduğum içündür sûret-i şer'îsi mâlûmum olmaksızın bu kadar reâyâyı kırsunlar deyu emr idemem".

84. For the turmoil in Istanbul that brought down two Sultans see: A. Yıldız, *Crisis and rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The downfall of a Sultan in the age of revolution*, I. B. Tauris, London 2017.

85. E. P. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat; ou, Histoire des réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu'à nos jours*, A. Cotillon, Paris 1882, p. 33.