Peace Progressives and American Neutralism, 1914-1917

by *Ross Kennedy*

"Neutrality" is an ambiguous term in international affairs. As Justus Doenecke writes, in one sense «neutrality is a legal status, one that brings into operation an entire series of rules regulating relations with belligerents". More broadly, American neutrality from 1914 to 1917 can also be interpreted simply to refer to a desire to avoid openly siding with one group of combatants in the war or the other. In that sense, the vast majority of Americans, including President Woodrow Wilson, favored "neutrality" up until early 1917, when Germany resumed its unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. This paper, though, will analyze the meaning of American neutrality within a narrower, but non-legalistic framework. The aim here is to understand the values and logic of the most influential opinion-makers who criticized official US neutrality policy as biased toward the Allies and who opposed US entry into the war in April 1917. This group included agrarian progressives led by three-time Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan; leftist progressives and moderate socialists such as Jane Addams, Paul Kellogg, and Crystal and Max Eastman; Republican progressive insurgents, including, most prominently, Senator Robert La Follette; and mugwumpish liberals like the manager of the "Nation" and the New York "Evening Post", Oswald Garrison Villard. Through their speeches and media outlets, and through the left's two umbrella peace organizations, the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) and the Woman's Peace Party (WPP), the "peace progressives" reached a massive – and receptive – audience, especially among farmers and the urban working class[1]. Although historians have explained various aspects of this group's ideology, they have not clearly conveyed how the peace progressive view of US national security, international power politics, and progressive reform combined together to lead them to define neutrality in terms of avoiding war and, at the same time, promoting peace[2].

Central to the peace progressives' case for neutrality was their conviction that however the war turned out, America's well being was secure. To be certain, they were not oblivious to the war's impact upon America.

They perceived that America's interests were "entwined" with those of other nations and that Europe's conflagration brought «disturbance […] in every department of human activity». Peace progressives never described these effects of the war as seriously damaging to the United States, however. America might be inconvenienced by the conflict and the life of the nation even disrupted to some degree. But none of this amounted to evidence that the war actually endangered America's fundamental economic, political, or social well-being[3].

Equating "national security" with America's ability to deter invasion and to defeat any would-be conqueror, peace progressives stressed the significance of geography and potential military strength in their assessments of the nation's safety. «We are protected on either side by thousands of miles of ocean», declared Bryan, and «additional protection» lay «in the fact, known to everyone, that we have the men with whom to form an army of defense if we are ever attacked; and it is known also that we have the money too». America's existing «coast defenses» reinforced this strength, argued La Follette, «making an overseas expedition against us […] practically an insuperable undertaking». Indeed, pointed out Lucia Mead of the WPP, Britain, with the finest navy in the world, had failed to subdue Gallipoli «and has not been able to bombard a German town». The idea that any nation could successfully invade America – or would even make the attempt – was simply not credible to peace progressives[4].

Peace progressives further argued that the war actually enhanced America's enviable position of security. Repeatedly, they insisted that whatever the outcome of Europe's conflict, «the result will mean such an exhaustion of resources, such a weariness of war, that no member of either side is likely to attack us for years to come». Victory in the war, peace progressives implied, would not replenish the victor's power nor add to it in any significant way. The hostility between the Central Powers and the Allies generated by the fighting, moreover, would likely continue after the war, which meant that the Europeans would remain absorbed with security threats from each other rather than with plotting against the United States. As AUAM leaders argued, a victorious Germany would not adopt a «bullying' policy» toward America because it would be «surrounded by jealous European foes who would not hesitate to spring again at her if she gave them an excuse». European power politics did not threaten American security at all in this analysis. On the contrary, the more the Europeans struggled against each other, the more secure the United States[5].

Peace progressives were not very worried about the war's implications for American trade either. While they supported more equal, open terms

for international trade, and denounced exclusive, imperialistic trade policies as one of the worst features of power politics, they never described an "open door" for American trade as vital to America's economic well being. «The United States is not dependent upon foreign commerce in the sense that Germany and Great Britain are», reported the *Public*, a progressive single-tax journal. «We are a small world to ourselves that cannot be starved or beaten by isolation». America, agreed Villard, was «practically a self-supporting nation» that had no national security need to protect its commerce overseas. This economic reality would not end any time soon, regardless of the course of the war[6].

The peace progressive analysis of US national security had deep roots in American political culture. Soon after the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton, discussing the new nation's defense requirements, noted that «Europe is at a great distance from us», with colonies in the Western Hemisphere too weak «to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance». George Washington, in his Farewell Address as president, likewise asserted that intra-European conflicts were of only «remote» concern to America; the US had no reason to involve itself in the «ordinary vicissitudes» of European political-military affairs. This view persisted through the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, even though in the 1812 conflict the British succeeded in burning Washington, DC; «we can never be invaded» declared one congressman during an 1821 defense debate, «without having sufficient time to prepare for the emergency». In the late nineteenth century, even as the United States acquired an overseas empire and rapidly expanded its navy, most US leaders continued to believe that America's geographic location in the world, its latent power, and existing rivalries between the European powers combined to make America safe from attack. «We are, in our continental position», declared Carl Schurz in the mid-1890s, «substantially unassailable»[7].

If peace progressives saw no national security reason for the United States to side with one group of belligerents or the other, they also assumed that doing so would lead to sharp increases in American military forces and intervention in the war – two developments they believed would militarize American society and destroy progressive democratic reforms. Peace progressives outlined in some detail the logic behind what they called the threat of «militarism» to America. Drawing on fears about professional «standing armies» dating back to the Revolution, they asserted that military service, especially if made compulsory through a program of universal military training (UMT), would undermine the citizenry's democratic spirit. «Free minds, and souls undrilled to obedience», argued Crystal Eastman of the AUAM, «are vital to the life of democracy». The whole point of «military

drill», however, was «to develop unquestioning obedience, so that the soldier will move forward in the face of danger and even certain death». At the same time, trainees confronted an organization that was «aristocratic» in nature, with a «fixed line between officers and men». «Cringing before men who abuse their power», taught to «stop thinking» and respond blindly to the will of others, it was no wonder to the editors of the *Nation* that a man exposed to military training became «an automaton»[8].

Peace progressives also stressed that military officers harbored anti-democratic attitudes that led them into aggressively anti-democratic behavior. Officers were used to giving orders and, «clothed with power to gratify caprice», to dominating others with arbitrary commands. Consequently, they showed little patience for civilian authority. They constantly claimed that they alone had the wisdom to decide military and foreign policy, complained Villard, actively lobbied Congress to increase the armed forces, and pressed for new national defense councils to determine public policy in «secret session»[9].

The policies that military officers advocated added to their power. Any «expert» in any field, observed Villard, tended to get so absorbed in his specialty that he was likely to «subordinate everything to the development of that specialty». Military experts acted no differently. «Their entire training leads them […] to fear the oncoming of the enemy and they habitually think of every possible combination that may be brought against them». They were therefore obsessed with organizing the country for war. Jane Addams believed that she saw the outcome of military thinking already taking shape in war-torn Europe, observing, in mid-1915, that a «military party» had become ascendant in each of the belligerent states. Censorship of the press had become rampant and, she worried, «the military power is breaking down all of the safeguards of civil life and of civil government». Fearing that excessive preparedness could spark a similar process in the United States, Addams became an early and central leader of the two key pro-neutralist peace groups, the WPP and the AUAM[10].

If the «military-naval oligarchy» embodied dangerously anti-democratic ideals and policy aspirations, so too did its chief allies, the «capitalists, imperialists, and war traders» who profited from defense spending and aggression overseas. Nearly all leading peace progressives saw in the preparedness movement, in Frederic Howe's words, «the same merger of interests, […] the same "invisible government' which for the past twenty years has been waging war on democracy» To peace progressives, preparedness programs furthered the interests of those who «look down with

undisguised contempt upon the masses» and who undermined the forces of democratic progressivism[11].

Reactionaries benefited from preparedness programs in several ways. Most obviously, corporate munitions makers reaped huge profits from preparedness, as did bankers who helped to finance arms purchases made by the American government and by belligerents (and in particular by the Allies) overseas. Their efforts to push defense increases through Congress by whipping the country into «a panic» distracted attention from economic and political injustices at home, and by identifying themselves with patriotism and security, reactionary preparedness advocates made passage of legislation aimed at curbing their power difficult[12].

Perhaps most disturbingly, expansion of the military served the interests of America's «upper and leisure classes» by providing them with the means to pursue «class […] aggression» at home and abroad. The «real basis for […] preparationist propaganda," charged Stoughton Cooley of the "Public", was «to provide an army to over-awe labor unions» and «to repress» them. James Maurer, a Pennsylvania labor leader active in the AUAM, pointed out that stepped-up military forces could be used «to dragoon the working people of the country» into corporate America's «battles for trade» overseas. Imperialist adventures could only further stimulate demands for military forces – and thus only further strengthen the hand of the reactionary plutocracy that advocated preparedness and imperialism in the first place[13].

To peace progressives, then, any foreign policy that involved or risked significant military expansion and involvement in war – as would be entailed by a policy of partiality toward the Allies or the Central Powers – was unacceptable, as it would mean the destruction of America's democracy at home. In addition to this conviction, peace progressives also closely linked neutrality with the ability of the United States to lead the world out of a dysfunctional system of "power politics" that caused the war and into a new, more peaceful international order based on democracy. In the existing international system, according to the peace progressives, international law, «the conscience of mankind». as the "Nation" called it, did little to restrain nations from competing for power. In pursuit of their goals, nations negotiated «secret and open alliances», concentrated foreign and defense policymaking in the hands of executive authority, and built massive military establishments. Peace, to them, could only be achieved by deterring aggression through a balance of power between the world's leading states; they believed, as Bryan put it, that «fear is the only basis upon which peace can last»[14].

This hope was a delusion, argued peace progressives, as the outbreak of the Great War obviously demonstrated. First, power politics exacerbated emotions of anger, suspicion, and hate that made the peaceful settlement of disputes difficult. Bryan elaborated on this problem in detail. Power politics, he argued, «presupposes the existence of an enemy who must be hated until he can be overcome». Hatred, however, «begets hatred» and pervaded the whole system. Twisted by their rage and fear, nations in the balance-of-power system succumbed to «the spirit that expresses itself in threats and revels in the ultimatum». Genuine negotiations became virtually impossible, as was clearly shown, Bryan believed, in the crisis that led to the war. «Firmness, supported by force" had ended in disaster for all concerned[15].

Peace progressives also identified a logical flaw in the proposition that a balance of power could preserve peace. Suffused with «an atmosphere of fear» and built on the «doctrine that force must rule our affairs», power politics encouraged arms competitions and pre-emptive surprise attacks. In the logic of the existing system, argued Samuel Danziger of the "Public", «adequate defense» meant creating «an armament more powerful than any possible combination of foes could bring against us". But that would only be a start, «for our potential foes might suspect that we were planning to attack them, just as we suspect them of planning to attack us. They would attempt to outstrip us in building armaments». To stop such a "race" in arms, one side would either have to quit, which made little sense given the assumption that only a balance of power could maintain peace, or «would have to find some pretext to attack the other when conditions for victory would seem most favorable». The behavior of the Europeans showed all too clearly which alternative was likely to be chosen; «preparations for war», concluded Danziger, «only lead to war»[16].

If they easily agreed on the nature of power politics, peace progressives somewhat varied in their analyses of its sources. The dominant position attributed the balance-of-power system to the ability of undemocratic, reactionary, militaristic groups to influence – indeed, to control – the foreign and defense policymaking of the major powers. Frederic Howe provided the most in-depth treatment of this thesis in his book, *Why War*, published in 1916. The foreign policies of the European great powers, Howe believed, were run by an alliance of three reactionary groups: the «old aristocracy of the land», who dominated the diplomatic and officer corps; the «new aristocracy of finance», who sought investments and concessions overseas; and the «munitions makers», who made «colossal» profits from armament sales. «These classes», Howe claimed, «own or control great

portions of the press. They mould public opinion. They control political advancement. They are society. These forces are the state». Operating «in the dark behind closed doors», they promoted and practiced the power politics – «the preparations for war, the irritations and the jealousies, the suspicions and the controversies» – that caused modern war in general and the Great War in particular[17].

The reactionaries embraced power politics for various reasons. The old aristocracy saw itself as «a caste apart» considered war its special «calling», and thought «almost exclusively in terms of its profession». «It is a mind which views democracy with contempt», argued Howe, «which thinks of the state as something separate and apart from the people, and for the preservation of which the peasant and the workman are but fodder for guns». The new aristocracy of the financial classes promoted power politics as a means to protect their imperialistic investments overseas. They pressed the policy that «the flag follows the investor», thus transforming the state, with its «narrow militaristic psychology», into the «insurance and collection agency for the investing classes». Their ultimate goal was «to secure a complete and exclusive monopoly» in their overseas concessions or territory «from which all other financiers and countries can be excluded», a goal that inevitably led to international conflict when it was pursued, as Howe thought it was, by each of the great powers. Finally, munitions makers fomented power politics because they made money out of it. To Howe, they, more than anyone except the «great financiers», were responsible «for the agitation for armament and "preparedness" and for the increase in war expenditures which has taken place during the last twenty years»[18].

In contrast to the old and new privileged classes, ordinary people gained nothing from power politics and war. Instead, they suffered «in lower wages, in higher costs of living, in burdensome taxes». Laboring classes suffered the most; they bore the cost of war and preparedness according to Howe. «Labor really gives its all», he lamented. «It gives life; it gives health; it gives home, family, and the few comforts which labor enjoys. And labor enjoys none of the profits». At the same time, war and war scares gave reactionaries an opportunity to reverse social legislation, cut money for «social needs», and whip up emotions of hate and vengeance that «shattered the foundation of the democratic mind and entangled the highways of democratic advance». Ultimately, Howe suggested, reactionary influences promoted power politics more for political than economic reasons: to maintain their power at home[19].

Over the course of 1914-1917, leading peace progressives embraced all or most of Howe's argument about the origin of power politics. Although the

leaders of the Woman's Peace Party emphasized that male aggression and ambitions were a primary cause of power politics, they alluded to Howe's analysis in their platform, condemning «the economic causes of war» and calling for «democratic control of foreign policies». "Survey" printed one of Howe's many articles, as did "La Follette's Magazine", and La Follette himself praised *Why War* as a «very able work». Even Villard, probably the least progressive of the leading peace progressives, blamed arms races and the war on munitions manufacturers, military officers, and «small ruling cliques, who, apart from the masses of the people, […] cling to the old shibboleths and still lust for conquests»[20].

At bottom, peace progressives believed that power politics and militarism were twins born of the same reactionary parents. Military officers, plutocratic imperialists, decadent aristocrats, and greedy munitions makers conspired together to provoke war scares, propagandize for preparedness, and defend exclusive spheres of interest around the globe. They either operated in secret, with little democratic oversight, or, when necessary, by manipulating the normally peaceful masses through fear and appeals to patriotism into supporting their schemes. Their intrigues both enhanced their power at home at the expense of democratic progress and militarized international diplomacy, thus making war almost inevitable. And war, of course, could only further perpetuate their power and wealth, both domestically and in international relations. Which came first – domestic militarism or power politics – was not clear. The way the peace progressives described it, the two were cause and consequence of each other, feeding off of each other to put the world on a road toward dictatorship and destruction.

To be certain, at times peace progressives suggested that a condition of «anarchy among nations» led to fears of attack and, in turn, to the development of power politics. But they did not pursue this line of thought. They recognized that the anarchical structure of the system was a factor in alliance-building, arms racing, and war, but they focused their analysis of the cause of power politics on the presence of anti-democratic forces operating within the various great powers. Thus, David Starr Jordan of the AUAM began one of his analyses of the war by asserting «the great conflict of our century is that between law and anarchy». Yet he went on to blame armies for «the spirit of international hate» and «privileged classes» in the officer corps for keeping alive «the idea of the righteousness and necessity of war». Anarchy as a cause of power politics faded from view, just as it did in the writings and platforms of other peace progressives[21].

Morally repulsed by the war and the power politics that lay behind it, peace progressives resolved to transform the international system – to end power politics forever and make any future war «unthinkable». Not surprisingly, given their analysis of the origins of power politics, the peace progressive formula for international reform stressed the need to intensify and spread democracy around the globe. «Democracy not only in Europe but in America is the first step toward peace», declared Howe, «and no permanent peace is possible so long as the privileged classes rule». Most broadly, this agenda called for the advancement of economic and political equality in all nations; the development of policies, including greater rights for organized labor, that promoted the common good over unrestrained individualism; and the use of government power to improve social welfare and to regulate and, in some sectors like transportation, to control the economy. Many peace progressives, and especially the members of the Woman's Peace Party, also pinpointed the extension of the vote to women as central to the democratization necessary for international reform. Women, as «custodians of [...] life [...] charged with the nurture of childhood and with the care of the helpless», argued the WPP, had to have the vote in order to counter «the politics of men» that ensnared the world in war[22].

Peace progressives also urged action aimed specifically at increasing «democratic control of foreign policy». To end the «secret diplomacy» of the militarists, they wanted legislative ratification of all international treaties and alliances, government ownership of munitions plants, and some version of a popular referendum on war declarations. «People do not want war», explained Howe. Hence, the more control ordinary people had over diplomacy and military matters, the less likely war would ever break out[23].

Howe and most other peace progressives put almost equal weight on the importance of anti-imperialism to the cause of international reform. While most of them fell short of calling for an end to the world's colonial empires, leading peace progressives did insist that a lasting peace depended in part upon reforming imperialism's monopolistic and predatory characteristics. To insure that colonialism was no longer, in Kellogg's words, «a scourge to backward races and a spur toward war among their exploiters», peace progressives called for neutralizing the world's seas, straits, and canals; lowering trade barriers and equalizing access to colonial markets; and stripping foreign investors of the protection they enjoyed from their home governments. Even if these measures would not destroy imperialism immediately, they would, thought the peace progressives, pacify and humanize its operation while undercutting the influence of anti-democratic groups inside the colonizing states[24].

With the spread of democracy and the removal of imperial trade monopolies and barriers, peace progressives expected power politics to fade from the international system. As a more peaceful world took hold, they envisioned strengthening the new order with an international agreement limiting armaments and the establishment of some sort of "concert of nations" to facilitate the settlement of international disputes. Exactly how the machinery of this peace league would work was unclear. In general, peace progressives wanted a court or investigatory commission to render judgments or recommendations concerning international disputes; at the least, states party to a dispute would forego going to war until a finding was reached. This idea of binding nations to a "cooling-off" period, *championed* especially by William Jennings Bryan, assumed that as an investigation by impartial authorities proceeded, passions would subside and public opinion in favor of peace would mobilize, thus averting armed conflict. Early on in the war, peace progressives were divided about whether or not a court's rulings should be enforced with military action. By 1916, though, most of them, wary of a peace league practicing the coercive tactics of power politics, leaned toward the enforcement of court judgments only through «moral forces» or economic non-intercourse, not military sanctions[25].

The internationalism of the peace progressives clearly reflected their faith in democracy as the most important force for peace in the world. In part, this confidence derived from the participation of many peace progressives in international organizations and movements involving labor, socialists, social workers, and suffragettes that proliferated after 1890 or so. To them, these enterprises provided vivid evidence of the spirit of international cooperation between diverse peoples that would underpin a reformed world order. Even more so, the peace progressives' optimism about democratic reform countering power politics was rooted in their view of the character and history of the United States: they saw the American experience as a concrete example of democratic peace in action. The United States, they asserted, lived in peace with «open boundaries" with its neighbors. Its various states, spanning the continent, likewise lived in «amity» with each other, bound together by the Constitution, showing that «treaty-making may be lifted up to a new and inviolable estate». Its diverse population, «ninety million people drawn from Alpine and Mediterranean, Danubean, Baltic, and Slavic stocks» with «a culture blended from these different affluents», demonstrated «that progress lies in the predominance of none». In short, the United States itself showed the promise of internationalism based upon law and democracy. It mattered little to peace progressives that this narrative ignored both the power political aspects

of American history – such as, for example, the violent subjugation of Native Americans as the United States expanded westward and America's aggressive war against Mexico to acquire territory in the 1840s – and the ongoing, systematic racial discrimination against African-Americans, a group revealingly left out of their list of peoples making up America's «blended» culture. To the peace progressives, the United States provided the ideal model for the rest of the world to follow[26].

Preserving the strict neutrality of the United States in the war was absolutely central to the peace progressive view of how to achieve international reform. The doorway to reform, they perceived, lay in ending the war with what President Wilson termed in January 1917 a «peace without victory». If one side of belligerents won «so complete a victory as to be able to dictate terms […]», peace progressives reasoned, «it will probably mean preparation for another war». As Bryan explained, if such an outcome occurred, «the peace that would follow would be built upon fear, and history proves that permanent peace can not be built upon such a foundation». A war ending with a decisive victory by one side, added other peace progressives, would mean a war of «plunder, revenge, and conquest» sure to embitter the losers and sow the seeds of future conflict. International reform would be furthered, instead, by ending the war on the basis of a return to something like the status quo ante bellum, a «draw» which left «such a feeling of disgust that it will be comparatively easy to bring about the desires of our League to Enforce Peace»[27].

Rigid neutrality was the most effective way to accomplish this objective. It set up American mediation of the conflict, and peace progressives believed a mediated end to the war offered the best hope of achieving a peace based upon the status quo ante bellum. «If our nation is to remain neutral it must be indifferent as to the results of the war», Bryan emphasized; it had to «remain the sincere friend of ALL THE BELLIGERENTS, and thus become not only mediator but their accepted advisor in laying the foundation of a peace that shall endure»[28].

Peace progressives disagreed with each other about the specific components of a proper neutrality policy, however. Bryan's views, expressed both during and after his tenure as Wilson's secretary of state, represented the dominant position, as well as the ambiguities involved with defining "neutrality". As best he could, Bryan strove to be neutral in spirit and according to international law, and to resolve disputes between America and the belligerents peacefully, if necessary by sacrificing America's legal rights. Bryan's shifting policy toward American loans to the belligerents provides one example of these views. At first, right after the war started,

he opposed giving administration approval to American banks lending money to the belligerents. While there was no «legal objection» to such loans, Bryan thought they contradicted the goal of hastening an end to the war. They also were inconsistent with Wilson's declared policy of neutrality because, Bryan feared, U.S. citizens and banks would sympathize with the belligerents to whom they lent funds. In late September 1914, however, after France complained that the loan ban was unfairly hurting the Allies, Bryan reversed course and allowed private bank credits to the belligerents. He still opposed the sale of belligerent bonds to the public, however, and continued to so after leaving the administration in June 1915. For Bryan, the sale of war bonds violated the spirit of neutrality by engaging the public with one side or the other in the war – and that mattered more than the legality of such transactions[29].

Bryan's desire to remain impartial and avoid trouble with the belligerents informed his approach to American arms exports as well. Early on in the war, he agreed with State Department experts that the administration could not ban arms sales to the belligerents. According to the Department, except in cases involving "civil strife" in Latin America, the United States had never imposed an arms embargo against belligerent states, nor had the Europeans. Germany itself formally acknowledged the legality of arms sales and, in any case, the executive branch had no authority to prevent them. Furthermore, in Bryan's opinion, congressional efforts to enact an arms embargo were motivated by a desire to help the Germans and hurt the Allies; their «*purpose*», Bryan stressed, «is plainly to assist one party at the expense of the other». For all of these reasons, «any interference with the right of belligerents to buy arms here would be construed as an unneutral act». As such, Bryan opposed an arms embargo and worked hard to fend off resolutions in Congress to impose one[30].

When it came to dealing with Britain's maritime system, which interfered with American trade to Europe, Bryan agreed with President Wilson's early policy of avoiding confrontations with London. He did so because he saw threat-making as an ineffective way to preserve a nation's rights; «appeals to friendship», in Bryan's view, worked better. The weak protest note the administration sent to Britain on 26 December 1914 was consistent with this philosophy. It was a way to alert the British to their «mistake» in «unnecessarily arousing resentment among those interested in neutral commerce». It was precisely the lack of a threatening tone in the note that appealed to Bryan. «I think that it is the part of friendship to bring this matter to the attention of Great Britain», he advised Wilson, «in such a way as to lead to a careful consideration of the whole matter»[31].

The president's initial response to Germany's submarine warfare campaign and to the intensification of Britain's blockade in March also met with Bryan's approval. Probably because it employed less forceful language than its original draft and was balanced by a protest note to the British against their use of the American flag to disguise their ships in the war zone, Bryan endorsed Wilson's «strict accountability» warning to Germany to respect US neutral rights, sent on 10 February 1915. When a German submarine attack killed an American in late March, Bryan had little enthusiasm for confronting Berlin over the incident, fearing a strong protest would look unneutral given America's relative inaction concerning Britain's blockade. When Wilson decided not to act on the incident, the secretary was no doubt relieved[32].

In contrast, the president's about face after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, which killed almost 1200 people, including 124 American citizens, alarmed and disturbed Bryan. Wilson's decision to send a threatening note to Berlin, in Bryan's view, revealed a strong bias in favor of the Entente. The Allies would surely applaud the note, Bryan wrote the president, «and the more they applaud the more Germany will be embittered because we unsparingly denounce the retaliatory methods employed by her without condemning the announced purpose of the allies to starve the non-combatants of Germany» and to use passenger liners to transport munitions. Bryan also noted Wilson's continued passivity concerning Britain's misuse of the American flag and its «unwarranted interference with our trade with neutral nations». Wilson's confrontation with Germany, he argued, would encourage London «not to make any concessions at all" on these issues. The administration's policies, Bryan implied – and stated bluntly in a cabinet meeting on 1 June – were not neutral. They were «pro-Ally». A firm stance toward Germany would simply highlight this fact[33].

Wilson's demands, moreover, spoke the language of power politics, not of peace. There were two ways to conduct international relations as far as Bryan was concerned: the «old system» of «force» which had «set the world at war» and a «new system» of «persuasion» which had yet to be fully practiced. «Force speaks with firmness and acts through the ultimatum», Bryan explained; «persuasion employs argument, courts investigation and depends upon negotiation». As he interpreted Wilson's posture toward Germany, «it conforms to the standards of the old system rather than to the rules of the new». The president was practicing European-style politics, charged Bryan, and he would have as much success in gaining his ends peacefully as the Europeans had had in July 1914[34].

As an alternative to Wilson's policy of confrontation, Bryan recommended a reassertion of American impartiality toward the belligerents and unilateral American steps to de-escalate the crisis. As it protested Germany's submarine warfare, the administration should simultaneously renew its protest against Britain's maritime system. It should also signal Germany its willingness to have the dispute between the two nations investigated by an international commission for up to a year, as called for in the «cooling off» treaties Bryan negotiated with several countries prior to the war. Finally, Bryan urged the administration to warn American citizens not to travel in the war zone on belligerent ships and to refuse port clearance to American passenger ships carrying munitions[35].

When Wilson rejected these proposals in early June 1915, Bryan resigned as secretary of state. He then publicly advocated his program, and added more recommendations to it. Most prominently, in early 1916, he lobbied for what became known as the "McLemore-Gore resolutions". The ones introduced by Senator T. P. Gore essentially prohibited American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships and stopped them from traveling on any vessel carrying war contraband; the resolution proposed by Rep. Jefferson McLemore withdrew the protection of the United States government from American citizens traveling on armed belligerent ships. In addition, Bryan now made it clear that in the event a year-long investigation of the submarine dispute between Germany and the United States failed to produce a peaceful settlement, the United States should postpone any action on the issue until after the war in Europe was over. If America then decided upon armed conflict with Germany, Bryan argued, at least «it would then be our own war» and not one bound up with that of the Allies. «God forbid that we shall ever tie ourselves to the quarrels, rivalries and ambitions of the nations of Europe», Bryan declared[36].

To Bryan, his diplomatic agenda, not Wilson's, kept America truly «neutral» and thus offered the best hope of positioning America for mediation and for achieving international reform. The protest against Britain's blockade would «show Germany that we are defending our rights from aggression from both sides». Seeing America's impartiality and desire to treat both sides equally, Germany would be less likely to dismiss Wilson's protest and more inclined to have confidence in the president as a peacemaker. Bryan viewed his proposals to submit the submarine dispute to an investigation and to restrict America travel in the war zone in a similar light. This course, he argued, would «not only be likely to protect the lives of some Americans and thus lessen the chances of another calamity, but would have its effect upon the tone of the German reply and might

point the way to an understanding». The Reich, moreover, had accepted the principle of investigation at the heart of Bryan's «cooling off» treaties. Those treaties, signed between the United States and thirty other nations by 1915, «commit us to the doctrine of investigation *in all cases*», Bryan stressed to Wilson. The president had «no valid excuse for not resorting to the plan». By employing it – by in effect implementing international reform now –, Wilson could «emphasize [its] value» and perhaps even «exert a profound influence upon the making of the treaty between belligerent nations at the end of the war»[37].

Most other leading peace progressives shared Bryan's general approach to neutrality issues and his uneasiness with Wilson's *de facto* alignment of America with Britain. «How long», Robert La Follette wondered in September 1915, «can we maintain a semblance of real neutrality while we are supplying the Allies with munitions of war and the money to prosecute war?» Taking Bryan's desire to avoid confrontations with the belligerents to its logical end, La Follette and most of his supporters in the Senate wanted to embargo munitions exports, and La Follette specifically raised the possibility of banning all trade with the combatants if necessary to avoid war. Concerned about Wilson's pro-Allied bias, Edward Devine in the "Survey" also called for an arms embargo, as did Irish and German-American working class organizations that agreed with much of the outlook on national security affairs held by the Woman's Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism. The latter two groups did not take a stand on an arms embargo, although the editors of the "Public", who usually echoed their views, opposed one in part for the same reasons as Bryan. Whether an embargo occurred or not, however, most peace progressives were attracted to Bryan's "cooling-off" principle as a way to deal with international disputes and to his proposals to restrict American travel in the war zone[38].

The editors of the "Nation" charted a different course. More so than other peace progressives, the "Nation" supported Wilson's stance toward the belligerents, arguing it was in fact genuinely neutral. Since both arms sales and loans to the belligerents were legal under international law, the "Nation" supported them as consistent with neutrality. In the journal's view, Britain's March 1915 intensification of its maritime system amounted to a declaration of a formal blockade, which rendered it legal too. Whatever friction remained between the United States and Britain over America's trade with neutral ports was minor and technical, and Wilson's mild protests were the appropriate way to deal with it. Germany's violations of the laws of cruiser warfare, in contrast, were a policy of «piracy» and

«wickedness». Germany was trampling on «the law of nations and the law of God». Wilson had no choice, in the interest of upholding those laws, but to confront Germany in the manner he did. International law and the rights of humanity were «of more consequence than the changing aspects of the war», declared the "Nation", because they offered hope of «a better world» once the war was over. «Indeed», the editors insisted, «it is the moral aspect of the entire stand of our Government in the controversy with Germany which overshadows every other»[39].

In common with other peace progressives, however, the "Nation" opposed any military build up to support what it viewed as a stand for moral ideals. Peace progressives thought any significant expansion of America's existing military establishment would lead to militarism at home, would be inconsistent with the goal of reforming the international system, and would destroy America's chances for mediating an end to the war. As the editors argued in late 1914, when they first rejected calls for increases in America's armed forces, «how ineffective – how hypocritical – would be our appeal for peace, our offer of good services, […] if we were to make that appeal fresh from new concessions to the armament ring. Even worse, worried Crystal Eastman of the AUAM in July 1915, increasing America's military preparedness «at a critical time like this, is most obviously playing with fire – it is inviting war upon us»[40].

Rather than compromise America's moral authority to speak for peace by expanding the military, peace progressives instead urged Wilson to implement their program for international reform. As noted earlier, this was in essence Bryan's position in calling for the president to agree to a cooling-off period in the submarine crisis. Other peace progressives called for Wilson to pursue democratic social reform at home while at the same time convening a conference of neutral nations to offer «continuous mediation» of the war. This proposal, advocated especially by Jane Addams and the WPP, expressed the peace progressive belief that greater democratic control of foreign policy might advance peace. «With the military party in power in each country», explained Addams, «taking the censorship of the press into their hands, the whole stream of communication which ordinarily makes for international public opinion in Europe has been stopped». A conference of neutral states, open to «different groups in the belligerent countries who have programs they wish to propose as a basis for negotiations» and to «experts» who would explore the issues involved in the war», would create an irresistible momentum for peace talks. It would «release the pent up public opinion» for peace among both neutrals and «the people of the belligerents». «Struggling liberal groups within the

warring countries» would especially welcome a neutrals conference, as its recommendations would give them «an objective towards which to direct their governments». Lastly, a neutrals conference could also accelerate planning for international reform and present the belligerents with «an alternative to the […] militaristic method of settling the dispute»[41].

The peace progressives' last-ditch effort to prevent US entry into the war during the submarine crisis with Germany in early 1917 summed up the neutrality argument they had been making for the previous two years. «We run no danger of invasion», emphasized an ad hoc peace committee including Amos Pinchot, Randolph Bourne, and Max Eastman. Driven by desperation exacerbated by America's favoritism toward Britain, Germany lashed out at the Entente as best it could, and America unfortunately got in the way. Going to war over such "incidental" injuries made no sense to peace progressives. It would ruin whatever chance America had to mediate a «peace without victory» by allowing Britain to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Reich and by inflaming the military spirit of the German people and rallying them to their autocracy. «Besides losing our opportunity to serve the world», added the AUAM, «we should lose the best of our possessions – democracy and individual liberty». Belligerency meant conscription and the loss of civil liberties; «it means dictatorship», the AUAM declared. Rather than enter the war, the United States should waive its neutral rights, keep Americans out of the war zone, and try to work out some sort of accommodation with the Reich. Most peace progressives also endorsed armed neutrality as an alternative to belligerency, especially if America pursued it in cooperation with other neutrals. Such a policy, they argued, would maintain America's position as a neutral mediator and presage the formation of a league of nations. Certain that the vast majority of Americans opposed war while only Wall Street wanted one, peace progressives insisted, finally, that a popular war referendum precede any declaration of hostilities by Congress. Democratic control of foreign policy, they believed, offered the best chance of stopping America's march toward the abyss[42].

Despite their impassioned efforts, peace progressives failed to prevent Congress from following Wilson's lead and declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and Germany. The argument they developed in favor of neutrality, however, had a significant impact on American national security debates both during the war and after. In the immediate aftermath of the war declaration in April 1917, most leading peace progressives, to varying degrees, supported the US war effort. Their decision to do so was made easier by their affinity for

President Wilson's peace program, and especially for Wilson's vision of international reform. Their support for the president in 1917 and 1918 obscured important differences they had with him, however. Unlike Wilson, peace progressives continued to deny that the United States had any vital national security interest in achieving international reform. Their desire to reorder the international system reflected their moral opposition to power politics more than anything else. If reform failed, peace progressives thought the United States could and should stay out of power politics, as they believed America's isolated geographic location made it safe from foreign attack. Secondly, peace progressives recoiled from linking international reform in any way with the tactics of power politics. This was a major reason why they opposed Wilson's military preparedness program, which the president often depicted as part of America's contribution to a peace league. Similarly, when Wilson decided in 1919 that building a new world order depended upon punishing and weakening Germany and on excluding it for the foreseeable future from the League of Nations, most peace progressives concluded that the League amounted to little more than a victor's alliance. In their mind, power politics persisted, which led them to support limiting American commitments to the League or rejecting participation in it altogether. This stance helped to defeat the Versailles Treaty in the US Senate in late 1919 and again in 1920[43].

The peace progressive perspective on international affairs continued to reverberate in American policy debates in the interwar period. As Robert Johnson has shown, in the 1920s their foreign policy based on anti-imperialism and anti-militarism offered an alternative to the views of Wilsonians and Republican policymakers, and they were a major force behind the movement to outlaw war that eventually found expression in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Even as the leading peace progressives faded from the policymaking scene in the 1930s, their ideas remained influential. Most significantly, the outlook they promoted during World War I about US security, militarism, power politics, and the pro-Allied bias of Wilson's neutrality policy provided the intellectual framework for American isolationism[44].

Perhaps the most lasting legacy of the peace progressives, though, lay in their argument that democratic states are peaceful. They were not the first ones to assert this proposition, of course, and other US leaders, such as Wilson and William Howard Taft claimed it as well. But peace progressives made the case for what we would call today "democratic peace theory" more sweepingly and forcefully than either Wilsonians or conservative

internationalists. Once embedded in American discourse about international security affairs during World War I, it never disappeared. Indeed, the link Americans made about democracy and peace heavily influenced US policy toward Germany in the 1920s and again in the late 1940s, with profound consequences for the Cold War. It continued to shape US foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And it remains a core idea of US national security thinking today. For good or ill the shadow cast by the peace progressive struggle for US neutrality during the Great War has endured[45].

Note

1. J. D. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington 2011, p. 49. I am taking the term "peace progressive" from Robert D. Johnson, who uses it to describe the foreign policy perspective of a group of largely Midwestern senators in the 1910s and 1920s, including Robert La Follette. I am broadening the term to include the various groups listed here who shared many of La Follette's views. See *Robert D. Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1995. The outlook of Irish- and German-Americans on neutrality was complicated by ethnic factors and lay outside the scope of this paper.

2. For example, see H. H. Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the US Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 1993; J. Milton Cooper, Jr., *The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War, 1914-1917*, Greenwood Publishing, Westport (CT) 1969; A. Dawley, *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 2003; J. C. Farrell, *Beloved Lady: A History of Jane Addams' Ideas on Reform and Peace*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1967; M. Kazin, *A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan* Knopf, New York 2006; T. J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* Oxford University Press, New York 1992; E. A. Kuhlman, *Petticoats and White Feathers: Gender Conformity, Race, the Progressive Peace Movement, and the Debate Over War, 1895-1919*, Greenwood Press, Westport (CT) 1997; C. R. Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1972; D. S. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women's Activism and Citizen Diplomacy in World War I*, Routledge, New York-London 2008; J. A. Thompson, *Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1987.

3. W. J. Bryan, *Peace Day*, in "Commoner", 14, October 1914, p. 15.

4. W. J. Bryan, *A False Philosophy*, in "Commoner", 15, July 1915, p. 7; R. La Follette, *Imprudent Graft*, in "La Follette's Magazine", 8 September 1916, p. 2; L. A. Mead, *Compulsory Military Service*, in "Public", 19, 8 December 1916, p. 1166.

5. *A True American Voice*, in "The Nation", 99, 10 December 1914, p. 679; *Anti-Preparedness Committee*, in "Public", 19, 14 January 1916, p. 34.

6. *A Second Class Navy*, in "Public", 19, 30 June 1916, p. 603; O. G. Villard, *Preparedness*, in "New York Evening Post", New York 1915, p. 4. On the open door, see *For a Peace Conference of Neutral Nations*, in "Survey", 33, 6 March 1915, p. 598; A. Pinchot, *Preparedness*, in "Public", 19, 4 February 1916, pp. 112-3; F. C. Howe, *Why War*, University of Washington Press, Seattle-London 1970 [1916], p. 337.

7. J. Jay, A. Hamilton, J. Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, New American Library, New York 1961, p. 71; G. Washington, *Farewell Address*, 17 September 1796, in J. D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Bureau of National Literature, New York 1917, 1, p. 215; *Congressional Annals*, 16, 2, 16 January 1821, p. 890; C. Schurz, *The Venezuelan Question*, 2 January 1896, in *Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, ed. by F. Bancroft, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1913, 5, pp. 257-8.

8. C. Eastman, *War and Peace*, in "Survey", 37, 30 December 1916, p. 363; J. H. Dillard, *Militarism and Human Progress*, in "Public", 18, 24 December 1915, p. 1239; S. Cooley, *Military Democracy*, in "Public", 19, 2 June 1916, pp. 505-6; *The Universal Military Service Cure-all*, in "The Nation", 102, 11 May 1916, p. 511.

9. Cooley, *Military Democracy*, cit.; O. G. Villard, *Shall We Arm for Peace?*, in "Survey", 35, 11 December 1915, pp. 296-7; O. G. Villard, *Preparedness is Militarism*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 66, July 1916, pp. 218-9.

10. Villard, *Preparedness*, cit., p. 16; J. Addams, *The Revolt Against War*, in "Survey", 34, 17 July 1915, p. 356.

11. C. Jefferson, *Why Not Take This Step?*, in "La Follette's Magazine", 6, 3 October 1914, p. 4; Eastman, *War and Peace*, cit., p. 364; Howe, *Why War*, cit., p. 317; W. J. Bryan, *Shall Militarism Devour the Farm?*, in "Commoner", 16, January 1916, p. 3.

12. S. Danziger, *Adequate Defense*, in "Public", 17, 11 December 1914, p. 1177.

13. *A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders,* 8 May 1916, in *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. by A. S. Link *et al.*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1966-94, 36, p. 639; *A Memorial to the President of the United States by the American Union Against Militarism*, 8 May 1916, *ibid.*, p. 632; S. Cooley, *Undermining Liberty*, in "Public", 19, 21 July 1916, p. 676; *Swinging Around the Circle Against Militarism*, in "Survey", 36, 22 April 1916, p. 96. *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* hereafter abbreviated as PWW.

14. *The Week*, in "The Nation", 100, 28 January 1915, p. 95; O. G. Villard, *The United States and the Peace Treaty*, in "North American Review", 201, March 1915, p. 382; W. J. Bryan, *Making the Issue Clear*, in "Commoner", 15, July 1915, p. 1.

15. Bryan, *Peace Day*, cit., p. 15; Id., *The War in Europe and Its Lessons for Us*, in "Commoner", 15, November 1915, p. 14; Id., *The Real Issue*, in "Commoner", 15, June 1915, p. 3.

16. C. Jefferson, *Military Preparedness a Peril to Democracy*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 66, July 1916, p. 232; L. A. Mead, *America's Danger and Opportunity*, in "Survey", 35, 23 October 1915, p. 90; Danziger, *Adequate Defense*, cit., p. 1177.

17. Howe, *Why War*, cit., pp. 64, 63, 109, 5, 64 and 3-160, *passim*.

18. Ivi, pp. 154-5, 83, 155, 83, 98 (emphasis dropped), 110.

19. Ivi, pp. 310-2.

20. *Platform of the Woman's Peace Party*, 10 January 1915, reprinted in M. L. Degen, *History of the Woman's Peace Party*, Burt Franklin Reprints, New York 1939, pp. 40-1; R. La Follette, *Hold Fast to Real Patriotism*, "La Follette's Magazine", 8, May 1916, p. 2; Villard, *The United States and the Peace Treaty*, cit., p. 387. On male aggression, see E. Pthick Lawrence, *Motherhood and War*, 5, December 1914, in *The Eagle and the Dove*, ed. by J. Whiteclay Chambers II, Garland, New York 1991, pp. 46-9; Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue*, cit., pp. 60-1; B. Steinson, *American Women's Activism in World War I,* Garland, New York 1982, pp. 6, 9-10.

21. *On Being Practical*, in "The Nation", 103, 3 August 1916, p. 102; D.S. Jordan, *The Minimum of Safety*, in "Survey", 34, 1 May 1915, pp. 115-6. See also W. J. Bryan, *The Meaning of the Flag*, in "Commoner", 15, July 1915, p. 13; *The Larger Effects*, in "The Nation", 100, 20 May 1915, p. 553; E. Devine, *Humanity, Security And Honor*, in "Survey", 34, 7 August 1915, p. 432. On anarchy, see K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley,

Reading (MA) 1979 and J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton, New York 2001.

22. E. Eastman, *Correspondence*, in "New Republic", 3, 24 July 1915, p. 313; F.C. Howe, *Why War*, cit., p. 340; *A Woman's Peace Party Full Fledged for Action*, in "Survey", 33, 23 January 1915, p. 434; Carrie Catt quoted in Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue*, cit., p. 61. On the progressive reform agenda, see Thompson, *Reformers and War*, cit., pp. 40-70, 102; Dawley, *Changing the World*, cit., pp. 41-53.

23. Howe, *Why War*, cit., p. 3 and see pp. 343-9. See also *Platform of the American Union Against Militarism*, in "Survey", 36, 22 April 1916, p. 95; W. J. Bryan, W*hy Not a Referendum?*, in "Commoner", 16, February 1916, p. 6; R. La Follette, *Consult the People!*, in"La Follette's Magazine", 8, May 1916, p. 1; E. C. Bolt, *Ballots Before Bullets*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville 1977, pp. 2-26, *passim*; E. McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914*-1924, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY)1995, pp. 36, 52-4; Knock, *To End All Wars*, cit., pp. 50-5.

24. P. Kellogg, *A Bill of Particulars*, in "The Nation", 103, 3 August 1916, section 2, p. 1. Socialists and some labor radicals did call for the independence of colonies; see Knock, *To End All Wars*, cit., p. 53 and McKillen, *Chicago Labour*, cit., pp. 30, 50-1. See also *Towards the Peace That Shall Last*, in "Survey", 33, 6 March 1915; Pinchot, *Preparedness*, cit., pp. 112-3; Howe, *Why War*, cit., pp. 339-50, *passim*.

25. *A Woman's Peace Party Full Fledged for Action*, cit., p. 434; *This Week*, in "The Nation", 100, 11 February 1915, p. 156. For arms limitation agreements, see G.W. Nasmyth, *Constructive Mediation: An Interpretation of the Ten Foremost Proposals*, in "Survey", 33, 6 March 1915, p. 620. On the machinery of peace issue, see S. Cooley, *Enforcing Peace*, in "Public", 20, 2 February 1917, p. 101; B. and W. Howard Taft, *World Peace: A Written Debate* George H. Doran, New York 1917, p. 63; *Critics of the League to Enforce Peace*, in "The Nation", 104, 4 January 1917, p. 5; E. Devine, *Ourselves and Europe, II. Enduring Peace*, in "Survey", 37, 18 November 1916, p. 159; Degen, *History of the Woman's Peace Party*, cit., pp. 41-2, 154-9; *A Bill of Particulars*, in "The Nation", 103, 3 August 1916, section 2, p. 1; L. P. Lochner, *Peace Challenging Preparedness*, in "Survey", 35, 30 October 1915, p. 104 and *A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference*, 30 August 1916, *PWW* 38, p. 112; R. La Follette, *The Duty of Neutral Nations*, in "La Follette's Magazine", 7, March 1915, p. 8. For more on Bryan's "cooling-off" concept, see Paolo E. Coletta, *William Jennings Bryan's Plans for World Peace*, in "Nebraska History", 58, 1977, pp. 193-217.

26. *Towards the Peace That Shall Last*, in "Survey", 33, 6 March 1915. See also, J. Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War*, King's Crown Press, New York 1945, pp. 52, 111-5 and Dawley, *Changing the World*, cit., pp. 13-7.

27. Bryan to Wilson, 19 September 1914, *PWW*, 31, p. 56; Bryan to Wilson, 1 December 1914, *PWW*, 31, p. 379; Devine, *Ourselves and Europe, II*, cit., p. 158; *A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference*, 30 August 1916, *PWW*, 38, 112.

28. W. J. Bryan, *Wasting Time*, in "Commoner", 15, August 1915, p. 5 (emphasis in original). See also A. Hamilton, *The Attitude of Social Workers Toward the War*, in "Survey", 36, 17 June 1916, p. 308.

29. Bryan to Wilson, 10 August 1914, *PWW*, 30, p. 372. See also *Mr. Bryan On War Loans*, in "Commoner" 15, September 1915, p. 4. This interpretation is taken from A. S. Link, *Wilson*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1947-65, 3, pp. 62-4, 132-6.

30. Bryan to Stone, 20 January 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1914 Supplement*, Washington DC 1928; Bryan to Wilson, 6 January 1915, *PWW*, 32, p. 24 (emphasis in original). See also Link, *Wilson*, cit., 3, pp. 60-1; Bryan to Wilson, 24 December 1914, *PWW*, 31, pp. 521-2. Bryan also thought arms embargos encouraged arms racing between states. See Robert Lansing to Wilson, 6 August 1915, *PWW*, 34, p. 114; Lansing to Wilson, 5 August 1915, ivi, pp. 95-6.

31. *Force Only A Last Resort*, in "Commoner" 15, July 1915, p. 2; Bryan to Wilson, 24 December 1914, *PWW*, 31, p. 521. See also J. W. Coogan, *The End of Neutrality*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1981, pp. 173, 184-5, 204; Link, *Wilson*, cit., 3, p. 107.

32. Wilson to James Watson Gerard, 10 February 1915, *PWW*, 32, pp. 208-10; Bryan and Lansing to Wilson, 2 April 1915, ivi, p. 464; Bryan to Wilson, 7 April 1915, ivi, pp. 488-9.

33. Bryan to Wilson, 12 May 1915, *PWW*, 33, p. 166; Bryan to Wilson, 7 June 1915, ivi, p. 354; Bryan quoted in Link, *Wilson*, cit., 3, p. 411.

34. *The Real Issue*, in "Commoner", 15, June 1915, p. 3.

35. See Bryan to Wilson, 12 May 1915, *PWW*, 33, p. 166; Bryan to Wilson, 12 May 1915, ivi, p. 173; Bryan to Wilson, 3 June 1915, ivi, pp. 321-5; Bryan to Wilson, 5 June 1915, ivi, p. 342; Bryan to Wilson, 7 June 1915, ivi, pp. 353-5; *Two Points of Difference*, in "Commoner", 15, June 1915, p. 2; Link, *Wilson*, cit., 3, p. 414.

36. *The War In Europe and Its Lessons for US*, in "Commoner", 15, November 1915, p. 14 and see pp. 12-6, *passim*. See also Bryan to Wilson, 9 June 1915, *PWW*, 33, pp. 375-6; Link, *Wilson*, cit., 3, pp. 410-25; *Reply to Roosevelt's Interview*, in "Commoner", 15, September 1915, p. 3.

37. Bryan to Wilson, 12 May 1915, *PWW*, 33, p. 166; Bryan to Wilson, 14 May 1915, ivi, p. 192; Bryan to Wilson, 3 June 1915, ivi, p. 323.

38. R. La Follette, *Neutrality*, in "La Follette's Magazine", 7, September 1915, p. 1. See also Id., *The Duty of Neutral Nations*, ivi, March 1915, p. 8; Johnson, *Peace Progressives*, cit., pp. 56-68; E. Devine, *America and Peace: 1915*, in "Survey", 33, 2 January 1915, pp. 387-8; McKillen, *Chicago Labor*, cit., pp. 26-32 and 20-54, *passim*; *Neutrality and War Supplies*, in "Public", 18, 30 July 1915, p. 733; S. Danziger, *Bryan's Adherence to Principle*, ivi, 18 June 1915, p. 585; S. Cooley, *Peace, Not War*, ivi, 30 July 1915, p. 729; S. Danziger, *Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right*, in "Public", 19, 28 April 1916, p. 385; C. Eastman Benedict, *A Platform of Real Preparedness*, in "Survey", 35, 13 November 1915, pp. 160-1 and Thompson, *Reformers and War*, cit., pp. 129-32.

39. *The Week*, in "The Nation", 100, 1 April 1915, p. 344; *The Outlaw German Government*, in "The Nation", 100, 13 May 1915, p. 527; *The Larger Effects*, ivi, 20 May 1915, p. 553; *Not Two Governments, But Two Moralities*, ivi, 10 June 1915, p. 641.

40. *The 'Preparedness' Flurry*, in "The Nation", 99, 3 December 1914, p. 647; Eastman, *Correspondence*, *NR*, 3, 24 July 1915, p. 313. See also J. H. Dillard, *The Veil of Preparation*, in "Public", 18, 5 November 1915, p. 1071; Addams and Others to Wilson, 29 October 1915, *PWW*, 35, pp. 134-5.

41. WPP quoted in Degen, *History of the Woman's Peace Party*, cit., pp. 46-7; J. Addams, *A Conference of Neutrals*, in "Survey", 35, 22 January 1916, p. 495; WPP quoted in Degen, p. 46; *A Colloquy with Members of the American Neutral Conference*, 30 August 1916, *PWW*, 38, p. 110; *Two Memoranda by Louis Paul Lochner*, 12 November 1915, *PWW*, 35, p. 197; *A Colloquy*, *PWW*, 38, p. 109 and see Degen, cit., p. 47. See also Bryan to Wilson, 17 December 1914, *PWW*, 31, p. 480-1; La Follette, *The Duty of Neutral Nations*, cit., p. 7. On pursuing democratic social reform at home, see, for example, Pinchot, *Preparedness*, cit., pp. 110-2, *passim*.

42. Pinchot *et. al.*, *Referendum*, in "Public", 20, 17 February 1917, back cover; W. J. Bryan, *An Appeal For Peace*, in "Commoner", 17, February 1917, p. 2; AUAM, *The Argument Against War*, in "New Republic", 10, 31 March 1917, p. 275; Pinchot *et. al.*, *Do The People Want War?*, in "New Republic", 10, 3 March 1917, p. 145. See also R. La Follette, *The Armed Ship Bill Meant War*, in "La Follette's Magazine", 9, March 1917, pp. 1-4; P. Kellogg, *The Fighting Issues*, in "Survey", 37, 17 February 1917, pp. 572-7; *A League of Armed Neutrals*, in "The Nation", 104, 15 February 1917, pp. 178-9; Degen, *History of the Woman's Peace Party*, cit., pp. 180-91; Steinson, *American Women's Activism*, cit., pp. 220-48.

43. For a different interpretation of Wilson's relationship with the peace progressives, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, cit. For Wilson's preparedness proposals, Wilson and the

Versailles Treaty, and peace progressives and the League, see Ross A. Kennedy, *The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security* Kent State University Press, Kent (OH) 2009, pp. 46-7, 93-4; 182-202; 203-7.

44. Johnson, *Peace Progressives*, cit., pp. 105-268.

45. For a critical overview of democratic peace theory, see C. Layne, *Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace*, in "International Security", 19, 2, Fall 1994, pp. 5-49. On US policy toward Germany in the 1920s, see P. O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008; on policy toward Germany in the early Cold War, see, for example, M. P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992.