# James Mark Baldwin, Professional Disaster, and the European Connection

di *Robert H. Wozniak**

In 1908 James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934), Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Johns Hopkins University, was arrested in a Baltimore house of prostitution. At the time of his arrest, he was a leading contender for a mayoral appointment to the city school board. This juxtaposition of prostitution with schools and a belief among members of the Hopkins Board of Trustees that the university's reputation had been sullied by Baldwin's arrest created a scandal that, for Baldwin, rapidly snowballed into utter disaster.

## 1
## Professional disaster

By the end of March 1909, Baldwin had removed himself from contention for appointment to the school board ("Baltimore Sun", 9 March 1909, p. 12, col. 2) and taken a temporary leave of absence from Hopkins ("Psychological Bulletin", 6, p. 120). During this leave, he spent a month in Mexico, ostensibly as an educational consultant to the Mexican government, and then traveled to England and to the continent. As a result of his unexpected absence from the United States, he had to cancel an important lecture that he was to have given on the evening of 23 April as part of the Darwin centennial celebrations at the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia.

In mid-July, Baldwin was forced by the university Board of Trustees to resign his position at Hopkins. The announcement of his resignation indicated only that he would be spending a year in Europe "to give his voice a prolonged rest from continuous lecturing" ("Psychological Bulletin", 6, p. 256). In early August, he attended the 6th International Congress of Psychology in Geneva. Apparently still believing that he would be returning to American academic life, he lobbied the Congress for and received election to the Active Presidency of the 7th International Congress, which was to be held in Boston in 1913 (William James, 1842-1910, was to be Honorary President).

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By September 1909, however, Baldwin seems to have become aware of what to others must already have been obvious. He was never going to return to academic life in the United States. Using unnamed "friends" as intermediaries, he let it be known through the Baltimore newspapers that the reason for his resignation from Hopkins had been a *prior* intention to travel to Europe to "broaden his scope of educational knowledge and to inform himself as to the best methods of teaching prevailing in the old universities abroad" and then to take up a position as "head of a national university to be founded in [Mexico City]" from which position he would "have almost entire authority over the educational system in the republic of Mexico" ("Baltimore Sun", 16 September 1909, p. 12, col. 3).

Whether or not Baldwin honestly believed that he had been offered such a position, the reality turned out to be rather different. Early in 1910, he left Baltimore for Europe. To facilitate the transition, he gave up both editorship and ownership of two of psychology's most broadly influential journals: "The Psychological Review" and "The Psychological Bulletin". The first of these he had co-founded in 1894 with James McKeen Cattell (1860-1944), becoming sole owner and editor in December of 1903; the second of these he had founded on his own in 1904 (Sokal, 1997). In both he had a strong proprietary interest and giving them up must have been excruciatingly painful.

On 15 March 1910, "The Psychological Bulletin" carried an announcement that Baldwin had also resigned as President of the Seventh International Congress of Psychology. Acting on the belief that Baldwin's presidency would be an embarrassment to American psychology, the Organizing Committee, led especially by the Congress's two Vice-Presidents, Cattell and Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927), had pressured Baldwin to resign; and, bowing to the inevitable, he had agreed. Partly because of the scandal, but also because of the death of William James in 1910 and squabbling among members of the Organizing Committee, the Congress was eventually cancelled (Evans, Down-Scott, 1978).

In September 1910, Baldwin did finally make the promised trip to Mexico. However, his duties there were considerably more circumscribed than those originally reported. For the first month, he represented Oxford (from which he had received an honorary Doctorate of Science in 1900) at a series of celebrations marking the centennial of Mexican independence and the opening of the new National University in Mexico City; and from mid-October to mid-December, he gave a series of lectures on Psycho-sociology (published first in French and then subsequently in English, Baldwin, 1911a). By early 1911, he had returned to Europe, making only one last and somewhat abortive trip to Mexico in 1912. During this final visit, the civil unrest that came eventually to be known as the Mexican Revolution of 1910-17 was building in intensity. As Baldwin (1926, p. 156) himself described it, "At one of my

lectures – of which the authorities forbade the delivery – a riot broke out before the building and my wife and daughter were with difficulty smuggled through the crowd to the hotel". Despite the revolution and attendant anti-Americanism, Baldwin managed to deliver some of the lectures on Psychosociology that he had planned as well as a short course on the History of Psychology (Baldwin, 1913). As the political situation continued to deteriorate, however, Baldwin decided to give up his "professorship" and left Mexico for good in the fall of 1912.

Although Baldwin traveled back and forth between Europe and the United States with some regularity until 1914, his last American public appearance as a psychologist seems to have been a series of lectures given at the University of South Carolina and the Columbia College for Women in late 1912 or early 1913. On 1 February 1 1913, he sailed for Europe; and, except for occasional return trips to the United States necessitated by family business, he remained there, dividing his time between England and France until 1918, then settling more or less permanently in Paris, where he lived as a prominent member of the ex-patriot American community until his death on 8 November 1934 (for an interesting if at times somewhat speculative account of Baldwin's living situation between 1910 and 1918, see Horley, 2001).

## 2
## Professional accomplishments

By any standard, this story is one of tragedy – personal tragedy, obviously, for Baldwin, his wife, and his family; but also collective tragedy for the field of psychology. In Baldwin's downfall, psychology lost one of its most creative, productive, and influential practitioners at the height of his career. By 1909, in addition to having been appointed to the Hopkins professorship, initiating the publication of two major journals, and having been elected to the Presidency of the International Congress, Baldwin had many other accomplishments to his credit. He had founded psychological laboratories at the University of Toronto (the first in Canada) and Princeton and re-founded G. Stanley Hall's (1844-1924) lapsed laboratory at Hopkins. He had articulated a sophisticated biosocial theory of individual adaptation in two of the most seminal works in the history of developmental psychology: *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (Baldwin, 1895) and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (Baldwin, 1897). This theory will be summarized below; but for greater detail, see Wozniak (1982; 2001). And in *A New Factor in Evolution*, Baldwin (1896) had made a significant, if controversial, contribution to evolutionary theory, describing an evolutionary mechanism by which individual adaptations (i.e., those acquired in ontogenesis) might influence the course of phylogenetic evolution by natural selection. This

mechanism, now known as the "Baldwin effect", has come, in recent years, to be of considerable importance in evolutionary computation.

Even if this were all that Baldwin had accomplished when disaster struck, his position in the history of psychology should have been assured (although it was not, see Wozniak, 2004); but his credits also include a number of significant additional contributions. As President of the American Psychological Association, he published a presidential address, *On selective thinking* (Baldwin, 1898), that applied the concept of natural selection to the process of intellectual discovery. This paper is often cited as a landmark in evolutionary epistemology. Between 1898 and 1901, he recruited many of the greatest minds in the English-speaking world to the extraordinary task of providing systematic definitions for "all" of the major concepts in philosophy and psychology, definitions that he personally edited and, in many cases, revised. Published as the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (Baldwin, 1901-05), this 3-volume work (which also included a nearly definitive bibliography of philosophical and psychological publications) rapidly became known as "Baldwin's Dictionary". It has served as a prototype for all later reference works in psychology and is still an exceptionally useful resource for those interested in the history of ideas. Finally, between 1906 and 1911, Baldwin completed a three-volume, philosophical analysis of stages in "the development of cognition". The first volume focused on pre-logical thought, imagery, memory, play, and the rise of meaning (Baldwin, 1906). The second volume, on experimental logic, analyzed discursive thought, reflection, the development of logical meaning, and implication (Baldwin, 1908). The final volume, subtitled in part *Genetic Epistemology*, discussed synthetic "hyper-logical" operations believed by Baldwin to be expressed in aesthetic experience (Baldwin, 1911b). In recognition of Baldwin's extensive editorial efforts and of his many other contributions, Baldwin was awarded honorary degrees by the University of Glasgow, the University of South Carolina, and the University of Geneva in addition to that he had earlier obtained from Oxford.

## 3
## Why did Baldwin move to Europe?

One interesting question that arises from a consideration of Baldwin's many accomplishments and the magnitude of the disaster that befell him between 1908 and 1912 is why did he decide to relocate to Europe and what, if any, effect did this relocation have on the field. That he agreed to resign is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that immediately upon the heels of his resignation he had decided to leave Baltimore. As he described his decision in a letter to Titchener, he had chosen not to "fight the thing out" because of the

further damage that the scandal would do to his wife and his two daughters (Baldwin, 1910a). But why did Baldwin, with family living in relatively close proximity to Baltimore, decide to relocate to Europe rather than to somewhere else in the United States? I do not think that the answer to this lies in any desire on Baldwin's part, as Horley (2001, pp. 26-7) has suggested, to "*lay low*… while collecting awards… until the storm in North America blew over", but rather in the fact that Baldwin was very slow to give up his identity as a well-known and highly respected academic. He felt that he might better be able to retain some aspect of this identity in Europe than in America; and to an extent he was correct.

When disaster struck, Baldwin was, after William James, American psychology's best-known figure among European psychologists. This is especially impressive given the fact that James was almost 20 years Baldwin's senior and author of *The Principles of Psychology*, arguably the most famous work in the field (James, 1890). One obvious reason for Baldwin's renown among European psychologists was his editorship of the "Psychological Review". The "Review" included Alfred Binet (1857-1911), Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), James Sully (1842-1923), Pierre Janet (1859-1947), and C. Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) among its Associate Editors and frequently published or reviewed the work of a large number of other European psychologists.

A second reason for Baldwin's international reputation is that he was a frequent visitor to Europe. In 1884-85, immediately after graduation from Princeton, he attended lectures on Spinoza by Friedrich Paulsen (1846-1908) in Berlin and visited Wilhelm Wundt's (1832-1920) Psychological Institute at Leipzig. In April 1892, while serving as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Toronto, he made his first visit to France. As Baldwin (1926, p. 48) later described it: "with the intention of getting information on the subject of hypnotism and suggestion... I visited the Salpêtrière, saw the great Charcot at work, attended the clinics of Janet and others and...At Nancy… [saw] Bernheim… at work at the charity hospital of the city". This visit to Paris was important not only for its intellectual impact on Baldwin ("suggestion" and the closely related "dynamogenic" principle were central to his later view of adaptation), but because it introduced him to Pierre Janet. Janet was to become a life-long friend (indeed, Janet was the only psychologist to attend Baldwin's funeral in Princeton in 1934, serving as pall bearer) and, during the Paris years, an intellectual fellow traveler.

Throughout the years between 1892 and 1909, Baldwin (1926, p. 158) made it a regular "custom to go abroad in the summer vacations" – not only to England and France, but to Spain, Italy, Russia, Scandinavia, and Central Europe. Through these trips, regular attendance at international congresses, including, among others, the second (London, 1892), third (Munich, 1896), fourth (Paris, 1900) and sixth (Geneva, 1909) International Congresses of Psy-

chology, and correspondence, Baldwin maintained academic and, in many cases, personal relationships with a number of European psychologists, philosophers, and sociologists, including not only those mentioned above, but also, and most especially, Harald Høffding (1843-1931), Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), Édouard Claparède (1873-1940), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920), Karl Groos (1861-1946), and Theodore Ziehen (1862-1950).

Perhaps for this reason, Baldwin, more than any other American psychologist except perhaps William James, saw his works translated (and usually fairly quickly) into the major academic languages of Europe. By 1909, three of his works had been translated into French, German, and Spanish, another into Polish, and yet another into Italian.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in 1910, when William James vacated his position as Corresponding Member of the philosophical section of the French Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Baldwin was unanimously elected to succeed him. This honor must have come to Baldwin at a critical juncture, when little else was as he would have wished it. Indeed, in another of his letters to Titchener during this difficult period, Baldwin (1910b) even goes so far as to suggest that his election to the French Academy should be interpreted as something of "a vindication".

## 4
## Baldwin in Europe

It seems likely, therefore, that when Baldwin migrated to Europe in 1912, he had reason to expect a warm academic and perhaps even personal welcome. Although the archival evidence concerning Baldwin's years in Europe is exceedingly sparse, several events are known to have occurred that appear to confirm the fact that Baldwin was able to maintain some degree of academic identity during this period. The first has to do with his connection in 1913 with the Comité France-Amérique. As Baldwin (1926, p. 168) later described it himself,

> About this time I became enlisted in the work of the Comité France-Amérique, an organization formed to further good relations between the two Republics… Presided over by the eminent French statesman and historian, Gabriel Hanotaux, former Prime Minister, and having on its Executive Committee a number of well-known men from literary and artistic circles, it […] arranged lectures, printed a journal, and engaged in various kindred enterprises of this sort in Paris. I was asked to be one of ten lecturers, five French and five American, to present to French audiences various sides of French and American culture.

The French publication of Baldwin's 1913 lecture for the Comité, *L'idéal américain et l'idéal français* (Baldwin, 1914) inaugurated five-years of intense effort on Baldwin's part first to address issues of Franco-American cultural relations and then, with the advent of World War I, to lobby intensely for American entrance into the war on behalf of the Allies. During this period he published *La France et la guerre. Opinions d'un américain* (Baldwin, 1915a), *The Super-State and the "Eternal Values" Being the Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford* (Baldwin, 1916a), an attack on German political ideology, *La Neutralité américaine, sa cause et son remède* (Baldwin, 1916b) as well as numerous articles on peace and war and on American, French, and German thought and cultural values. Many of these were then collected as *Paroles de guerre d'un Américain, 1914-1918* (Baldwin, 1919).

The second event serving to help Baldwin maintain his academic identity occurred in 1918, as the war was finally and slowly beginning to wend it's dreary way to an armistice. Baldwin received appointment as a Lecturer at the École des hautes études sociales in Paris. Nothing is currently known about the circumstances of this appointment (although it may have had something to do with his vocal, energetic, and reasoned support of American entrance into the war on the side of the allies). Nor is anything known about the more general nature of the position, except that Baldwin's duties apparently included lecturing on the history and development of American thought (his course, given in English, was entitled *Vues sur la civilization américaine*), not an unreasonable assignment in view of the various cultural and ideological analyses that Baldwin had published in the five years preceding this appointment.

The third event or, more properly, series of events allowing Baldwin to remain attached to academic issues is, in many ways, the most important, for Baldwin during this period, and for psychology at large. These were the extended conversations on theoretical issues of mutual interest that Baldwin held with Pierre Janet. Although we don't know exactly when these conversations began in Paris, it is likely that they formed a continuation of discussions that had begun long before.

## 5
## Baldwin and Janet

Baldwin had first met Janet in 1892, on the initial trip to France; and the two had also met and talked at both the London and Munich International Congresses of Psychology (see Baldwin, 1926, for an amusing account of their meeting at Munich). However, the first extended opportunity they had to discuss ideas of mutual interest did not come until 19-22 November 1906 when,

after delivering the Lowell Lectures in Boston, Janet traveled to Baltimore to visit Baldwin and lecture at Hopkins.

From the outset, Baldwin and Janet must have found common intellectual ground. While Baldwin had no clinical experience and Janet had no experience in the study of children, both shared a hierarchical evolutionary conception of mind derived from Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). In Baldwin's case, this view came directly from a reading of Spencer begun around 1892. In Janet's case, it was probably mediated, at least in part, by Ribot, whose "law of dissolution" (disease leads progressively to the dissolution of functions in the inverse order of their evolution) was derived from John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) who had developed a similar law under the influence of Spencer (Young, 1970). During the Baltimore conversations, Baldwin, who had long argued for a general parallelism between phylogenetic and ontogenetic development (e.g., Baldwin, 1895) must have impressed upon Janet the importance of supplementing the evolutionary perspective they held in common with an ontogenetic point of view. And indeed, in Janet's first major publication after 1906 (*Les névroses*, 1910), psychopathology (specifically psychasthenia and hysteria) is conceptualized not only in evolutionary terms, but in terms of ontogenesis, as a disease of arrested development.

Be that as it may, sometime after Baldwin finally settled permanently in Paris, probably around the time of his appointment to the École des hautes études sociales and toward the war's end, when conversation could once again reasonably turn to matters theoretical and philosophical, the discussions with Janet began again; and they began in earnest. Baldwin became a frequent dinner visitor to Janet's opulent apartment at 54 rue de Varenne and the two met often for lunch (Piaget, 1982). Indeed, their meetings were so frequent that Janet was once heard to remark that "We talked so much with each other that I don't have to read his [Baldwin's] books" (cf., Prévost, 1973; Ellenberger, 1978).

The discussions between Baldwin and Janet, which no doubt ranged not only over Janet's and Baldwin's own ideas but also over related writings of William James and Josiah Royce (1855-1916), works with which Baldwin was intimately familiar, soon bore fruit in Janet's thought. This seems to have occurred first, and apparently as early as 1919-21 (see discussion of the impact of these ideas on Jean Piaget, 1896-1980, below), in Janet's weekly lectures at the Collége de France, and then eventually in a number of publications, many derived directly from these lectures (Janet, 1926; 1928a; 1929; 1932; 1935; 1936).

It was during this period that Janet began to develop his new Theory of Conduct; and in this theory a number of general themes emerged that almost certainly reflected his conversations with Baldwin. This is not to argue that Janet's Theory of Conduct is in any way derivative. Quite the contrary, Janet was a powerful and original thinker, easily Baldwin's intellectual equal. It is

rather to suggest that the conversations with Baldwin came at a critical juncture in the development of Janet's ideas. As he began to devote less attention to clinical description and more to developing a general theory of mind, Janet was able to make use of Baldwin's ideas (as well as those of James and Royce) to further his own thinking. In doing so, however, he embedded these ideas in a distinctly Janetian framework.

## 6
## Baldwin's theory of individual adaptation

To lay the groundwork for a discussion of the ways in which ideas in Janet's new Theory of Conduct converged with those of Baldwin, it will be useful to provide a brief overview of certain of Baldwin's views, most especially his theory of individual adaptation, of the social mind, and of the stages of intellectual development. These will each be addressed in turn.

As articulated in *Mental Development*, Baldwin's theory of individual adaptation, in its most general form, holds that all organisms are characterized by a tendency to relate to stimulation by acting on it (the principle of "dynamogenesis"). When action is adaptive, it is under the guidance of two principles: *habit* and *accommodation*. *Habit* is both a tendency to engage in a particular action and the ability to repeat actions that have been successful in the past. *Accommodation* is the adaptive process by which habit is altered to incorporate new possibilities for action. At its most basic and general level, accommodation takes place through a congenitally-given "circular" process in which pleasurable or painful stimulation elicits varied movements, some of which lead to the repetition of pleasurable or inhibit repetition of painful stimulation. The criterion for successful adaptation by which actions are incorporated into the habit system is, therefore, prolongation of pleasure and reduction in pain. This simple circular process serves as a prototype for all higher forms of accommodation, even those that take place mentally through the mediation of consciousness.

When Baldwin focused on conscious accommodation, he described "conscious imitation" as a particular type of circular reaction. Whatever is present in consciousness is a joint function of the external stimulus presentation, on the one hand, and habit as a tendency to action (and also, therefore, the basis for the attribution of meaning to that stimulus presentation) on the other. In *conscious imitation*, action elicited dynamogenically by the consciousness of stimulation more or less mirrors the stimulus and therefore tends to reproduce it. The stimulus as reproduced then itself enters consciousness as part of the succeeding stimulus for the next action. Conscious imitation, in other words, tends to perpetuate itself in a circular reaction. While it is most easily observed in very young children (since in children it

exists in its simplest and purest form), Baldwin believed that, as mediated by additional factors – memory, association, and voluntary attention – it underlies even the complex conscious accommodations of the adult.

In his theory of individual adaptation, Baldwin had proposed a biologically given process by which action, consciousness, and an underlying dispositional system (habit) change adaptively in relation to a constantly changing external reality. Baldwin's strong interest, however, also lay in the development of the social mind; and, in *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, he extended his biologically-based concept of adaptation through circular reaction to the social domain.

Like all consciousness, *social consciousness* (e.g., the infant's perception of a parental smile) is a joint function of habit and an external stimulus presentation (in this instance termed "*social suggestion*" to emphasize the dynamogenic nature of social consciousness) and tends to realize itself in social action. *Social action*, in turn, may either *imitatively* mirror social suggestion (e.g., the infant smiles in return) or vary from it *inventively* (e.g., the infant sticks out her tongue). In either case, just as action always alters the stimulus presentation, *social action* changes the *social stimulus* (e.g., the baby feels herself smile or stick out her tongue and sees the parent's answering response). This newly altered social stimulus then contains elements that are relatively novel as well as those that are familiar. Assimilation of this combination of novel and familiar to habit forces an accommodation with concomitant change in social consciousness expressing itself in new social action which again changes the social stimulus, leads to ever newer accommodations, social consciousnesses, social actions, and so on – in a circular process of social adaptation that continues throughout life.

The criterion for success by which *social actions* are incorporated into the habit system Baldwin terms "social confirmation". *Social confirmation* is an alteration in social stimulation that results from and reflects the nature of social action (e.g., the parent's returning the infant's smile). With development, as novel social actions are selected through social confirmation and incorporated into the child's own social habit repertoire, the child's sense of Self comes to reflect his sense of the social Other. The growth of the Self, in other words, is from the outside in, through incorporation of that which is already present in the Other. At the same time, however, as novel social actions are incorporated into the child's social habit system, they become available to give meaning to the actions of the Other. The child's consciousness of the Other, therefore, comes to reflect consciousness of Self. Growth in understanding other minds depends on growth in understanding one's own mind. Baldwin refers to this Other-Self-Other aspect of the process of social adaptation as "the dialectic of the social self".

This dialectic and the social stimuli, social actions, and social confirma-

tions that constitute it all exist in a broader social context from which they receive cultural meaning. In *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Baldwin (1897, p. 301) terms this context "social heredity", describing it as "the mass of organized tradition, custom, usage, social habit, etc., which is already embodied in the institutions and ways of acting, thinking, etc., of a given social group, considered as the normal heritage of the individual social child". *Social heredity* is, in effect, the system of social meanings into which the child is born and to which the child must become enculturated.

Finally, in Baldwin we also find a stage theory of mental development. Variously elaborated in publications spanning more than ten years and not always described in exactly the same fashion, it consisted, fundamentally, of three major levels beyond a neonatal starting state in which the newborn is presumed to engage the world through instinctive reflexes (Baldwin, 1897). The first major stage beyond the reflex, which Baldwin terms "Spontaneous", is defined by the emergence of *Imitation*. In this stage, stimulation that enters the child's consciousness tends to issue in immediate action. The child, in other words, is highly suggestible. A child in this stage might be conscious that the mother is angry; and that consciousness might lead immediately to tears.

Baldwin labels the second major stage "Reflective". As the name indicates, this stage is defined by the emergence of a new functional capacity, the capacity for *Reflection* (i.e., consciousness of consciousness). Consciousness can now operate at one level of remove from the environment. The child in this stage is not only conscious that the mother is angry but conscious of being conscious (i.e., knowing) that the mother is angry. With reflection comes the beginning of voluntary control and the possibility of inhibiting direct and immediate action on the environment.

Finally, at the highest stage, which Baldwin terms "Hyper-Reflective", a new and still higher mental function emerges. This is *Synthesis*, the ability to be conscious of the relation between thoughts that are already themselves reflective. In this stage, the child can not only be conscious that the mother is angry and conscious of being conscious that the mother is angry but conscious that others in the house are not aware that the mother is angry and, most importantly, conscious of the difference between the states of consciousness belonging to those others and the child's own state of consciousness.

In light of current work on theory of mind, this is obviously an interesting and important theory (articulated almost one hundred years before empirical research on theory of mind was to begin). It is also intriguing that the stages are functionally rather than structurally defined. What distinguishes Baldwin's stages, in other words, is not a set of particular organizational states of the habit system (i.e., of cognition), but a set of mental tendencies, a set of progressively higher mental functions.

# 7
# Janet and the new Theory of Conduct

The major themes that emerged in Janet's work during the period following World War I are well described by Valsiner and van der Veer (2000) in their superb analysis of the historical development of the concept of sociogenesis. These themes include: "(a) the idea that all mental acts are inherently social; (b) the idea that all human conduct is originally related to actions; and (c) the idea of the developmental nature of conduct" (p. 118); and (d) the idea that Mind develops both phylogenetically and ontogenetically through a hierarchy of functional tendencies.

Each of these will be briefly discussed in turn, generally following Valsiner and van der Veer (2000), albeit with some few minor modifications. The first theme – mind is inherently social – includes two sub-themes. One, clearly influenced by Baldwin (indeed, Janet, 1936, refers to it as "Baldwin's Law"[1]), is the idea that human personality is constructed on the basis of our knowledge of the social Other, just as our understanding of the Other comes to reflect our understanding of Self. As Janet (1936, pp. 55-6; eng. trans. Valsiner, van der Veer, 2000, p. 119) puts it, "the two personalities are constructed together… the one perpetually influences the other".

The second is clearly compatible with the first but less influenced by Baldwin and more in line with Janet's own flirtation with behaviorism and the view of John B. Watson (1878-1958) that thinking is sub-vocal (i.e., inner) speech (Watson, 1920). This is the idea that higher mental functions (e.g., thinking, memory) develop in the context of and for the purpose of social interaction and communication and only later become the private mental acts of the individual. Development, in other words, proceeds from the external to the internal.

The second theme – all human conduct is originally related to action – had a very long history in Janet's writings. In his dissertation, for example, Janet (1889) had already articulated a view of "suggestion" that was very close to a concept that, in the modern era, has become known as the "sensorimotor principle". When the field of awareness is greatly reduced (as it is, for example, in catalepsy or, for that matter, in infancy) external stimulation (e.g., the commands of another, sight of a toy) is immediately, automatically, involuntarily, and unreflectively transformed into action. The implication of this view is that the Mind is fundamentally dispositional, a system of tendencies to action. This was a concept that deeply influenced Baldwin in his own early work and became, as we saw, a cornerstone of his theory of individual adaptation. It was also an idea that Janet substantially elaborated as he developed his new Theory of Conduct.

In the Theory of Conduct, as Valsiner and van der Veer (2000) make clear: "Janet argued that human higher mental functions, such as language, emo-

tions, and memory, are intimately connected to action: language, because it is originally a command to perform some action; emotions, because they are actions, or regulators of actions […]; and memory, because it is originally a postponed action… By actions, Janet meant observable movements of the human body" (p. 122). The relationship between this view and the idea that Mind is inherently social is obvious. Actions are, de facto, in the world. They are external and public and therefore necessarily change the very situation, especially the social situation, that elicits them. This too is an idea that was evident in Baldwin.

The third theme – the developmental nature of conduct – also consists of two related ideas, one reflective of Baldwin's views, a second more specifically Janetian. The first is quite general and has to do with the fact that, for Janet, not only do mental processes develop both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, there is a critical distinction to be drawn in this regard between lower and higher organisms. Among lower organisms, development occurs solely through hereditary transmission and the mechanisms of natural selection. However, among higher organisms, and especially among human beings, heredity is social and cultural. Humans learn individually by imitation and instruction and pass along what they have learned to future generations via the provision of examples and education. Given that the "Baldwin effect" has to do with the impact of individual acquisitions on phylogenetic development and that Baldwin himself relied very heavily, as we will see below, on the concept of "social heredity", these are ideas with which he would have been quite familiar.

The second component is more specifically Janetian and has to do with the concept that the development of higher mental functions (e.g., memory), both in phylogenesis and in ontogenesis, proceeds from external action (e.g., reenactment in the case of memory), to the creation of external signs (e.g., tying knots in a handkerchief), to elementary verbal symbols (e.g., simple description). to the creation of enculturated systems of operations superimposed upon one another (e.g., narrating or inventing a story for another person for a particular social goal). While the specifics of this view might not have been particularly Baldwinian, the general idea that there is a parallelism between the development that takes placed in phylogenesis and that which occurs in ontogenesis was, of course, central to Baldwin's thinking (e.g., Baldwin, 1895).

Finally, Janet's Theory of Conduct was based on a notion of Mind as a hierarchy of tendencies (i.e., functions) developed through phylogenesis, individually acquired in ontogenesis, and subject to regression in the presence of mental disease. These tendencies exist at three major developmental levels (lower, middle, higher), each with a number of sub-levels. The critical differences between levels are defined by the emergence of new psychological

functions, including but not limited to imitation, reflection, and experimental reason. While the development of lower tendencies is under biological control, higher tendencies are acquired through a process of enculturation. Finally, as development proceeds and higher tendencies emerge, lower tendencies do not disappear, but become reorganized and subordinated to these higher tendencies. Although many of the specifics of Janet's hierarchical system of tendencies go beyond anything Baldwin had proposed, the basic system of three major, functionally defined stages, characterized at least in part by the emergence of imitation, reflection, and experimental reason respectively is, as we have seen, very much in keeping with Baldwin's view.

## 8
## Baldwin, Janet, and the "younger" generation

Two things seem immediately apparent from the above description of Janet's ideas. The first is that they articulate in very interesting ways with those of Baldwin. Indeed all of the major themes of Janet's later Theory of Conduct can be found, sometimes fully developed, sometimes in embryonic form, in Baldwin. It is worth reiterating that this is *not* to suggest that Janet's views were derivative of those of Baldwin. On the contrary, one strongly suspects that Baldwin gained as much from his conversations with Janet as Janet did from Baldwin. The difference, of course, is that Baldwin had ceased to publish and Janet was just hitting his stride as a general theorist. We will never know whether Baldwin would have altered his views in accommodation to those of Janet. We do know, however, that the basic direction taken by Janet's new theory is similar in significant ways to that of Baldwin. It seems reasonable to suppose that this direction was both reinforced and perhaps even to some extent shaped by Janet's discussions with Baldwin.

The second is that there are numerous points of contact between the views of Baldwin and Janet and two theories with which contemporary developmental psychologists are much more familiar, viz., those of Piaget and Lev. S. Vygotsky (1896-1934). Familiar "Piagetian" concepts such as "assimilation", "accommodation", "circular reaction", "genetic logic", and even "genetic epistemology" are to be found in Baldwin's works. The idea that stage development is hierarchical with higher stages reorganizing and incorporating lower stages is implicit in Baldwin and explicit in Janet; and emphasis on "action" as a basis for meaning and the "sensorimotor" principle is common to both Baldwin and Janet.

Familiar "Vygotskian" concepts are also present in both Baldwin and Janet. These include: *a*) the general idea of "sociogenesis" *b*) the more specific assumption that development proceeds from the external and social to the internal and personal, from the Other to the Self; *c*) the idea that the child

is heir not only to a physical heredity but to a social heredity defined as a system of meanings to be internalized in the process of enculturation; and *d*) the hierarchical view of Mind as a system of progressively more complex functional tendencies. In addition, Janet makes it clear that higher mental functions arise only in the process of enculturation.

How did these extraordinarily important ideas find their way into the thinking of these young, soon-to-be-famous members of the generation to follow Baldwin and Janet? In Piaget's case, the first acquaintanceship with Janet's ideas dates from the period 1914-18, when Piaget's burgeoning interest in psychology led to his reading James, Ribot, and Janet (Piaget, 1952). Then, in the Fall of 1919, Piaget traveled to Paris, where he spent two years attending courses at the Sorbonne. While Piaget is silent in his autobiographical statements on whether or not he audited Janet's lectures at the Collége de France, his first publications in child psychology clearly demonstrate the influence of Janet. Indeed, in a later reference to these early years, Piaget (1975, p. 107) called Janet "his true teacher in psychology". And when Piaget was interviewed about his contact with Baldwin, he indicated that he "knew Baldwin, above all, through Pierre Janet" (Piaget, 1982, p. 82). In this interview, he also indicates that he then went on read *Mental Development* (Baldwin, 1895), *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (Baldwin, 1897), and the first volume of *Thought and Things* (Baldwin, 1906).

In the case of Vygotsky, the mediation may have been more indirect. As described by van der Veer and Valsiner (1988; see especially p. 59 for a discussion of particulars), Vygotsky, if not personally acquainted with the man, was well acquainted with Janet's works (especially Janet, 1928b; 1929). On several occasions Vygotsky explicitly credited Janet with developing not only the concept of sociogenesis but more particularly the idea that our understanding of ourselves directly reflects our prior understanding of others (something that, as we saw earlier, Janet in turn had called "Baldwin's law").

Baldwin, on the other hand, although cited by Vygotsky, is not cited in connection with the concept of sociogenesis. Van der Veer and Valsiner (1988, p. 60) therefore suggest that "Vygotsky used Janetian ideas in constructing his version of the sociogenetic theory" rather than those of Baldwin. While there seems little doubt that Vygotsky did profit from reading Janet and that those aspects of Baldwin's theory that can be found in Vygotsky could well have come through Janet, it is by no means impossible that Vygotsky, who was said to read English fluently, could also have read Baldwin. Lack of relevant citations notwithstanding, it is unlikely that we shall ever know.

In conclusion and by whatever the route, it would seem as though James Mark Baldwin, in disgrace in the United States and without students of his own to carry on his legacy (Wozniak, 2004), found in Europe that which he could not find in his own country – intellectual acceptance and, in the per-

son of Pierre Janet, a sympathetic mind. In the early years, the influence was unidirectional, flowing from Janet to Baldwin. By 1906 in Baltimore, when Baldwin, at the height of his intellectual powers, had published both *Mental Development* and *Social and Ethical Interpretation*, and was at work on his genetic logic, it seems likely that the influence was mutual. During the Paris years, after Baldwin's active contribution to psychology had ceased (his last major publication was *Genetic Theory of Reality*, Baldwin, 1915b), Janet undoubtedly influenced Baldwin; but in what ways we shall never know. That Baldwin, dining with his good friend Pierre Janet, helped stimulate, reinforce, and develop Janet's ideas seems certain. What Janet, in turn, did for Baldwin was to help him maintain his identity as an intellectual in exile and, even more importantly in the greater scheme of things, to pass along aspects of Baldwin's thought to two members of a younger generation that were to exert enormous influence on the field. Through Piaget and Vygotsky, Baldwin's ideas have been transmitted to those who are even younger, albeit in greatly revised, expanded, and developed form. Because this social inheritance has led to an interest in the intellectual roots of Piaget and Vygotsky, Baldwin has been rediscovered; and through this rediscovery, his name has been kept alive in a history of psychology that might otherwise have forgotten him completely.

## Note

[1] That Janet refers to the dialectic of the social self as "Baldwin's Law" is particularly interesting in light of the fact that Baldwin's view of the social self as well as his position on the role of imitation in social life closely paralleled ideas articulated by the French sociologist, Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) – ideas with which Janet might be presumed to have been familiar. Indeed, there are those to whom Baldwin's ideas appeared distinctly derivative to those of Tarde. In a private letter to Tarde (quoted in Lubek, 1981), for example, Gustavo Tosti even goes so far as to accuse Baldwin of plagiarizing Tarde's two main works in this area, viz., *Les lois de l'imitation* (1890) and *La logique sociale* (1895). It is important to note, however, that in his published commentary on Baldwin's debt to Tarde, Tosti (1902, p. 552) stops short of an actual charge of plagiarism and provides no evidence for his assertion that Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations* is "substantially *a transcription of Tarde in another key*". If Baldwin was, in fact, guilty of plagiarism, this has still to be systematically documented (see Lubek, 1981, for additional analysis in this regard).

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